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THE MINNESOTA LAW OF CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS
AND ANALOGOUS EQUITABLE REMEDIES
By EDWARD G. JENNINGS* AND IRVING S. SIHAPIRO**
FOREWORD
N

SEVERAL recent cases the supreme court of Minnesota has had

occasion to cite with apparent approval pertinent sections of
the Restatement of Restitution.1 Not all of the propositions of
that Restatement can be squared with previous Minnesota authority. In some instances an apparent conflict dissolves under
analysis. The present article undertakes a comparison of the Minnesota case law with some of the propositions of Part II of the
Restatement, entitled "Constructive Trusts and Analogous Equit-

able Remedies."
I.

KINDS AND NATURE OF EQUITABLE RELIEF AVAILABLE

The principal remedial devices of equity whereby a beneficial
interest in misappropriated or otherwise improperly acquired prop2
erty is preserved for the rightful owner are the constructive trust

and the equitable lien.3 Subrogation 4 in a sense is a special form
of constructive trust or equitable lien, and is likewise a method of
following property into its product-differing from other forms
of constructive trust or equitable lien, however, in that equity
further preserves the product from the operation of circumstances
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
**Senior law student, University of Minnesota Law School; member
board of student editors, MINNESOTA LAW REviEw, 1938-1940.

'Mehl v. Norton, (1937) 201 Minn. 203, 205, 275 N. W. 843, 844 (secs.
1, 2); Ives v. Pillsbury, (1938) 204 Minn. 142, 146, 283 N. W. 140, 142
(sec. 186) ; Penn Anthracite Mining Co. v. Clarkson Securities Co., (1939)
205 Minn. 517, 522, 287 N. W. 15, 18 (sec. 166) ; Risvold v. Gustafson,
(Minn. 1941) 296 N. W. 411, (secs. 160, 190, 197).
Restitution (1937), sec. 160.
"Restatement,
3
Restatement, Restitution (1937), sec. 161.
'*Restatement, Restitution (1937), sec. 162.
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that otherwise would result in its destruction, for the purpose of
imposing the trust or lien upon it. In the majority of instances
5

Although Professor Bogert treats subrogation as a substitute for tracing, see 4 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, (1935) sec. 930, it would seem that
subrogation, as much as the constructive trust or equitable lien, is really a
method of following property into its product-the product being a chose in
action or a lien originally held by another, which the one subrogated thereto
has unofficiously discharged, or which his property without his consent has
been used to discharge. As distinguished from the usual instances of a
constructive trust or an equitable lien, however, equity through subrogation
in a sense also creates the product upon which it impresses the trust or lien,
by keeping alive, for the benefit of the one subrogated, a chose in action or
lien otherwise effectively discharged by payment. Subrogation more often
accomplishes the equivalent of an equitable lien than of a constructive trust.
For example, one who voluntarily but unofficiously discharges the obligation
of another at a discount is not entitled to profit by the transaction, and is
entitled through subrogation to enforce such obligation against the primary
obligor only to the extent of the amount he paid in procuring its discharge.
Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 162, comment i; in accord, see Baker
v. Terrell, (1863) 8 Minn. 195 (Gil. 165, 170). As in the last preceding
sentence, the word "voluntarily" was used by the court in the case cited
as meaning merely that the payment was consciously willed by the payor,
without duress of person or property or the immediate threat of legal proceedings. But "one who pays where legally liable," as in the case cited,
is not a "volunteer" in the sense in which that word is used categorically to
describe a class of persons not entitled to subrogation. Felton v. Bissel,
(1878) 25 Minn. 15, 20-21. In such cases, which are the most typical instances of subrogation, it accomplishes the equivalent of an equitable lien.
On the other hand, "where an obligor consciously misappropriates the property of another and uses it in discharging an obligation, the other is entitled
by subrogation to enforce the full amount of the obligation and is not
limited to the value of his property which was used in discharging the
obligation." Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 162, comment i; see, also,
sec. 153 and sec. 207, comment e; 3 Scott, Trusts (1939) sec. 513.1. In such
cases subrogation accomplishes the equivalent of a constructive trust. As
in the case of constructive trusts and equitable liens, there are instances in
which subrogation is available although the beneficiary has no cause of
action in personam against anyone. See, for example, White River Township v. Dorrell, (1901) 26 Ind. App. 538, 59 N. E. 867 (plaintiff had loaned
$500 to township which was without power to borrow, but which used the
money in completing payment of contractor's valid claim for building a
schoolhouse; plaintiff held subrogated to contractor's claim against defendant
township to the extent of $500).
Subrogation to a secured or preferred
claim has the same utility as a constructive trust or an equitable lien in
affording security against the beneficiary's being compelled to share with
general creditors in the event of the insolvency of the one personally liable.
Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 162, comments e and f. Subrogation
to a chose in action that is neither secured nor preferred affords no security
as against the obligor's insolvency, any more than would an ordinary constructive trust or equitable lien imposed upon such a chose in action; but,
the same as either of the latter remedies, it may afford security against
the insolvency of a wrongdoer who, for example, uses misappropriated funds
to discharge the obligation of another person, not a bona fide purchaser for
value, who remains solvent. See Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 208
(3). While the bona fide purchaser for value rule occasionally defeats subrogation in cases wherein it would otherwise be granted, see Ahern v.
Freeman, (1891) 46 Minn. 156, 48 N. IV. 677, 24 Am. St. Rep. 206, it is not
nearly so frequent an interloper as in the law of constructive trusts and
equitable liens generally, for the reason that subrogation presupposes payment and discharge that normally take a chose in action out of further
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the constructive trust or equitable lien is imposed for the benefit
of one who was originally the legal or equitable owner of the misappropriated or otherwise improperly acquired property. Where
he was the legal owner the imposition of a constructive trust or
equitable lien upon the same property or its proceeds' presupposes
power in another either to acquire or to transfer the legal title, or else
ratification by the legal owner of a conversion or an unauthorized
sale-since otherwise he remains the legal owner, his possessory
legal remedies are presumptively adequate, and the one withholdcirculation except as regards the one subrogated thereto. In Minnesota,
contrary to the rule of Restatement, Contracts (1932) sec. 174, and of Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 172, comment b, a bona fide purchaser
for value of a nonnegotiable chose in action apparently does not take free of
latent equities of third persons. Brown v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., (1899)
75 Mfinn. 412, 78 N. W. 103, 671, 79 N. W. 969; Restatement, Contracts,
Minn. Annot. (1934) sec. 174. It is also the law in this state that a mortgage lien, although following the debt which it secures, does not partake of
the negotiable qualities of a mortgage debt embodied in a negotiable instrument, so that a mortgagor who pays the mortgage debt in whole or in part
to the original mortgagee, without actual knowledge of its prior assignment,
is entitled to a corresponding satisfaction of the mortgage as against the
assignee, Johnson v. Carpenter, (1862) 7 Minn. 176 (Gil. 120, 125) ; First
Nat'l Bank of Goodwin v. Marshall State Bank, (1927) 172 Minn. 571, 572,
216 N. W. 231, 232; Johnson v. Howe, (1929) 176 Minn. 287, 290, 292, 223
N. W. 148, 149-150; Rea v. Kelley, (1931) 183 Minn. 194, 196-197, 235 N. W.
910, 911, although remaining personally liable upon a negotiable mortgage
note to a holder in due course, Blumenthal v. Jassoy, (1882) 29 Minn. 177,
12 N. V. 517. It is specifically provided by statute "that the record of an
assignment of a mortgage shall not in itself be notice of such assignment
to the mortgagor, his heirs or personal representatives, so as to invalidate
any payment made by either of them to the mortgagee." 2 Mason's 1927
Minn. Stat., sec. 8225. The record of an assignment is constructive notice,
however, to a subsequent grantee of the mortgagor, so that a payment
made by him to the original mortgagee does not correspondingly satisfy
the mortgage as against the latter's assignee. Johnson v. Howe, (1929) 176
Minn. 287, 223 N. W. 148. In the light of these rules it would seem
that the principal situations in which the bona fide purchaser for value rule
can affect the right of subrogation in Minnesota are the following: (1)
Where a mortgagor conveys real or personal property, which is subject
to an unrecorded mortgage to which his surety would otherwise be subrogated upon payment of the mortgage debt, to a bona fide purchaser for
value; (2) Where a negotiable instrument to which one would otherwise
be subrogated has been transferred before maturity to a holder in due
course; and (3) Where the obligor of a chose in action gives value for
its discharge by another, without notice of circumstances which would
otherwise give rise to an equity of subrogation in the latter. But as regards the third situation it should be noted that the Minnesota court has
not applied the bona fide purchaser for value rule as freely to the discharge
of an obligation, as distinguished from its purchase, as does the rule of
Restatement, Restitution (1937), sec. 14. See Grand Lodge A. 0. U. W.
v. Towne, (1917) 136 Minn. 72, 161 N. W. 403, L. R. A. 1917E, 344,
noted (1918) 1 MINNESOTA LAw REvIEw 176; compare Langevin v. City
of St. Paul, (1892) 49 Minn. 189, 51 N. W. 817, 15 L. R. A. 766 (in
accord in result with Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 14 (1), illustration (2), but not decided upon the basis of the bona fide purchaser for
value rule).
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ing possession has nothing upon which to impose a constructive
trust or an equitable lien. 6 Where the misappropriation or otherwise improper acquisition was of property already held under
an express trust, the effect may be none the less the creation of a
constructive trust or an equitable lien upon the same property or
its proceeds-the latter remedies arising "by operation of law
without any reference to any actual or supposed intention of creat7
ing a trust and frequently directly contrary to such intention."
In some instances the constructive trust or equitable lien is imposed for the benefit of one who never previously has been either
the legal or equitable owner of the property in question.8 But
where the facts otherwise justify either remedy, the problem of
subsequently following the property is the same whether the
interest of the beneficiary grew out of previous legal or equitable
ownership or first arose out of the very transaction giving rise
to the constructive trust or equitable lien. It makes no difference
whether we start out with property beneficially owned by the
6Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 160, comment j. Specific recovery in equity, in favor of the holder of the legal title, of the mere
possession of property, is not a form of constructive trust. Compare Note,
(1934) 12 North Car. L. Rev. 400, where it is suggested that the constructive trust device should be used for the protection of victims of
thefts, "for a constructive trust device is merely a remedial device for
preventing unjust enrichment in a given case, and not a technical conI
cept."
7
Sieger v. Sieger, (1925) 162 Minn. 322, 324, 202 N. W. 742, 743; 3
Scott, Trusts (1939) sec. 461, p. 2311.
SThus a transfer inter vivos that constitutes a wrong by either the
transferor or transferee or both to a third person may result in the imposition of a constructive trust or an equitable lien upon the property in favor
of the latter. Restatement, Restitution (1937) secs. 168, 169. A conveyance
fraudulent as to the grantor's creditors is an illustration. See Comment,
(1922) 6 MINNESoTA LAw REviErv 170. Under the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyances Act, adopted in Minnesota, an unsecured creditor who acquired
his claim prior to such a conveyance may sue to have it set aside as fraudulent without having first reduced his claim to judgment at law and had
execution thereon returned unsatisfied. 2 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., secs.
8483-8484. So also one who acquires property by will or intestacy or as
the beneficiary of an insurance policy, through fraud or an unfulfilled
promise to convey such property to or hold it in trust for another to whom
the decedent or insured would have left it had it not been for the fraud or
unfulfilled promise, may be decreed to hold the property upon constructive
trust for such other person. Restatement, Restitution (1937) secs. 184-186;
Barrett v. Thielen, (1918) 140 Minn. 266, 270, 167 N. W. 1030, 1032,
168 N. W. 126; see, also, Ives v. Pillsbury, (1938) 204 Minn. 142, 146,
283 N. W. 140, 142. Similarly a fiduciary who acquires property for himself that he should have acquired for his beneficiary will be decreed to
hold the same in constructive trust for the latter. Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 194; City of Minneapolis v. Canterbury, (1913) 122 Minn.
301, 142 N. W. 812; Whitten v. Wright, (1939) 206 Minn. 423, 429, 289
N. W. 509, 511: "He [the errant fiduciary] is held to be a trustee not because of his intent but in spite of it."
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holder of the legal title, with property held under an express trust,
or with property already held subject to a constructive trust or an
equitable lien-in any event the enforcement of either of the latter
remedies against the property or its proceeds is a form of securing
specific restitution of identifiable property or its identifiable
proceeds. 9
The chief utility that the constructive trust and the equitable
lien share in common consists in affording security against the
beneficiary's being compelled to share with general creditors in
the event of the insolvency of the one or more persons individually
liable. Where the constructive trust or equitable lien is imposed
upon an ordinary chose in action that is neither secured nor preferred, it of course affords no security to the beneficiary against
the insolvency of the obligor of such chose in action; but it may
none the less afford security as against the insolvency of another
who has become personally liable to the beneficiary, as, for example, where an insolvent wrongdoer invests the beneficiary's
property or its proceeds in an unsecured and unpreferred chose
in action against a perfectly solvent obligor.' ° There are also
some instances in which either or both of these remedies are available although the beneficiary may have no cause of action in
personam against anyone.'
The principal difference in the relief respectively achieved by a
constructive trust and an equitable lien consists in the fact that the
constructive trust preserves for the beneficiary the entire equitable ownership of the misappropriated or otherwise improperly
acquired property, and its product arising from subsequent transmutations,12 whereas the equitable lien preserves for him merely
9"Hence the necessity, in order to impress a fund with a trust on this
ground, to establish its identity with the property or fund which was
originally subject to the trust." Twohy Mercantile Co. v. Melbye, (1899)
78 Minn. 357, 360, 81 N. W. 20, 21.
'OSee Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 202, illustration 9.
"As where, for example, a municipal or public corporation issuing
invalid bonds is held to be neither contractually nor quasi contractually
liable to the holders, but a constructive trust or equitable lien for the benefit of the latter may nevertheless be imposed upon the identifiable proceeds
or product of the bonds. Shaw v. Board of Education, (1934) 38 N. M.
298, 31 P. (2d) 993, 93 A. L. R. 432; Nuveen v. Board of Public Instruction, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1937) 88 F. (2d) 175, certiorari denied, Board of
Public Instruction v. Nuveen, (1937) 301 U. S. 691, 57 Sup. Ct. 794,
81 L. Ed. 1347, noted (1938) 22 MINNmSO TA LAW REvIEw 287; see, also,
Note,2 (1920) 4 MINNESOTA LAW REvmw 155, 158.
1 For an interesting recent illustration, see Flannery v. Flannery Bolt
Co., (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1939) 108 F. (2d) 531, noted (1940) 39 Mich. L. Rev.
340.
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a security interest in such property. or its product, limited generally by the amount of the beneficiary's personal right of restitution.' - Where the property or its product has been inextricably
commingled with other property, the constructive trust preserves
for the beneficiary a proportionate interest in the whole, whereas
the equitable lien preserves for him a security interest in the
whole, limited by the amount in which the original property or its
product can be traced into the whole, where that is less than the
total amount originally secured by the lien.14 Under some circum3
1In the majority of instances an equitable lien secures a personal right
of restitution. But it may exist where there is no such remedy in personam.
See the cases cited in note 11, above; see, also, as to existence of equitable
lien upon property of another improved by the act of the wrongdoer, Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 208 (2), comment b, and Comment,

(1939) 23
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706.

' 4 Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 212, adopting the "lowest intermediate balance" rule. In the application of this rule, confusion may readily
result from failure to ascertain the specific consequences of each of successive comminglings, and of the commingled funds or a part thereof earning
a profit. Consider Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 212, illustration 4:
"A wrongfully deposits in a bank $1,000 belonging to B together with
$1,000 of his own. He draws out and dissipates $1,500. He invests the remaining $500 in shares of stock which he sells for $1,500. B is entitled
to a lien on the proceeds for $1,000. If he sells the shares for $3,000 B is
entitled at his option to enforce a constructive trust as to one-half of the
proceeds, or $1,500." These results are reached through the following
steps: Through the original wrongful commingling, B acquired an undivided
half-interest in the whole $2,000 on the constructive trust theory, and a lien
for $1,000 upon the whole $2,000 on the equitable lien theory. Therefore, when
only $500 remained, B still had only an undivided half-interest therein
on the constructive trust theory, but on the equitable lien theory he had
become the sole beneficial owner, for security purposes, of the entire $500,
since his lien for $1,000, having attached to the whole, remained attached
to the part still identifiable, absorbing it entirely. The shares of stock in
which the $500 was invested, and their proceeds, were entirely the product
of property covered by B's lien for $1,000. Therefore his lien attached,
still for $1,000, to all the shares of stock and their entire proceeds. He
could not have claimed the entire $1,500, or $3,000, as the case may be,
on the constructive trust theory, since that would mean a shifting from
the equitable lien theory, as applied to the $500, to the constructive trust
theory as applied to its proceeds. He could not thus change horses, since
it was only as security that the entire $500 could be considered as belonging to him.
Now suppose that in the above illustration, at the stage where only
$500 remained of the original $2,000, A had added $500 more of his own
funds. B would then have an undivided one-fourth interest in the commingled $1,000 on the constructive trust theory, and an equitable lien for
only $500 upon the entire $1,000 on the equitable lien theory. For the
additional $500 supplied by A is in no sense the product of the $500 absorbed by B's lien. The consequences of another commingling attach, so
that B's lien extends to the entire $1,000, but only for $500, since that is
the extent to which the funds upon which he previously had a lien can
be traced into the whole. However, they will have thereby contributed
fifty per cent to any profit made by investment of the commingled $1,000,
so that the original lien for $1,000 will carry over as against the traceable
product to the extent of $500, pIns fifty per cent of such part of the
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stances the beneficiary is entitled to assert either remedy, while
under others he is entitled only to an equitable lien. 15 Under
some circumstances the two remedies may produce identical results, ° while under others they produce different results, depending upon whether the property or its product upon which the
trust or lien is sought to be imposed has gone up or down in
value, and upon the extent to which it has become commingled
with other property or has been dissipated. By seeking to impose a constructive trust, the beneficiary thereby "adopts" the
transactions of the wrongdoer with the property as having been
made for his benefit, thus relinquishing a cause of action against
the latter personally that he may also have had.17 By seeking to
product as may be characterized as profit. See Scott, The Right to Follow Money Wrongfully Mingled With Other Money, (1913) 27 Harv. L.
Rev. 125, 134-135: "If after the fund is reduced by withdrawals, and after
an addition is made by the wrongdoer from his own funds, the total amount
is then invested . . . the claimant should have a lien on the investment
for a sum equal to the lowest amount to which the fund was reduced,
plus that part of the profit which can fairly be said to be the product of
that amount. . . . Thus, if A mingles $1,000 of his own with $1,000 of
B's, and then dissipates $1,500, and later adds $500 of his own and invests
the $1,000 in stock which he sells for $1,500, B should have a lien on the
$1,500 for $750, that is for the $500 in which he had an interest, and on
the profit fairly attributable to that $500, namely one half of the whole
profit, or $250. Of course, no matter how large the profit arising from the
investment in the stock, the claimant cannot, on the lien theory, get more
than $1,000, the amount originally contributed by him. On the constructive
trust theory he is entitled to one fourth of the proceeds of the stock, for
he has contributed one fourth of the money with which it was purchased."
But where the wrongdoer, instead of adding funds of his own, uses the
funds upon which another has a constructive trust interest or an equitable lien in the purchase of stocks on margin, or otherwise in the purchase
of property subject to mortgage or pledge for the balance of the purchase
price, Professor Scott and the Restatement take the view that the constructive trust or equitable lien attaches in an undiminished proportion or
an undiminished amount to such shares or other property or their proceeds, upon the theory that they are entirely the product of the funds to
which the constructive trust interest or equitable lien had previously applied. See Scott, The Right to Follow Money Wrongfully Mingled With
Other Money, (1913) 27 Harv. L. Rev. 125, 135, note 27, explaining the
result in City of Lincoln v. Morrison, (1902) 64 Neb. 822, 90 N. W. 905, 57
L. R. A. 885, upon this ground; Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 210,
comment f. Compare the opposite inference contained in statements by the
Minnesota court in Shearer v. Barnes, (1912) 118 Minn. 179, 186, 136 N. W.
861, 863, and in Martin v. Baldwin, (1883) 30 Minn. 537, 540, 16 N. W. 449,
450, as applied to the facts of those cases, for which see below, note 39.
Other aspects of the problem of tracing property held subject to constructive trust or equitable lien into its products, as illustrated by the
Minnesota
cases, are discussed in section III of the text.
35 Restatement Restitution (1937) sec. 161, comment a.
6
1 For example, where wrongfully commingled funds have neither been
dissipated in any degree nor earned any profit, it makes no difference
whether the beneficiary claims a proportionate share of or a lien upon the
entire funds. See Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 209, comment a.
17Shearer v. Barnes, (1912) 118 Minn. 179, 189, 136 N. W. 861, 864.
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impose an equitable lien he loses no rights that he may have
against the wrongdoer personally, except to the extent that he
secures satisfaction by the enforcement of the lien.1 8 Choosing
the more advantageous of the two remedies, where both are available and may produce different measures of recovery, obviously
presupposes an understanding of the peculiar incidents of each
in their application to specific factual situations. As to these basic
distinctions between the constructive trust and equitable lien
remedies, the Minnesota cases are generally in accord with the
propositions of the Restatement, although in some cases the court
has confused the two in terminology, 19 while in others counsel
apparently have failed to utilize the right remedy to its most
advantageous extent. 0
With respect to the specific enforceability of the constructive
trust remedy the Restatement has taken the position that
"The constructive trust arises apart from the insolvency of the
constructive trustee, although a court of equity may refuse to
enforce it specifically if the remedy at law is adequate; but if the
constructive trustee is insolvent, so that a judgment or decree for
money would not be an adequate remedy,
the constructive trust
' '2 1
then becomes specifically enforceable.

Of course if the misappropriation or other wrongful acquisition
was by a trustee of an express trust or by one otherwise occupyThe mutually exclusive character of the two remedies is implicit in the
phraseology of the propositions of the Restatement. See, for example, section 211, subsections (1) and (2). The rule there stated is that where
a conscious wrongdoer "mingles money of another with money of his
own and subsequently makes withdrawals from the mingled fund, the
other is entitled to an equitable lien upon the part which remains and the
part which is withdrawn or upon their product," or "at his option to a
proportionate share both of the part which remains and of the part which
is withdrawn or of their product." It would seem clear by the rule as
stated that the beneficiary may not impose an equitable lien upon one
part, and a constructive trust upon the other part, as might best suit his
interest. See Comment, (1936) 14 Tex. L. Rev. 125.
'sSee, for example, American Railway Express Co. v. Houle, (1926)
169 Minn. 209, 210 N. W. 889, 48 A. L. R. 1266; Restatement, Restitution 9(1937), sec. 202, comment d.
1 See, for example, where the court has talked the language of constructive trust although apparently imposing only an equitable lien, Ramsden v. O'Keefe, (1864) 9 Minn. 74 (Gil. 63, 66-67); Kiefer v. Rogers,
(1872) 19 Minn. 32 (Gil. 14, 23); American Railway Express Co. v.
Houle, (1926) 169 Minn. 209, 210 N. W. 889, 48 A. L. R. 1266.
20See, for example, Sieger v. Sieger, (1925) 162 Minn. 322, 202 N. W.
742. 21
Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 160, comment f. Compare 3
Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, (1935) sec. 472, p. 1458: "In a suit to obtain
a constructive trust, it is not necessary to prove the inadequacy of the
remedy at law. The complainant may freely elect between the relief which
the law can give him and the constructive trust device."
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ing a fiduciary position, the beneficiary may follow the property
under an ancient and accepted form of equity jurisdiction without
regard to the adequacy of the remedy at law.22 Yet even where
one is defrauded of his property by a nonfiduciary, the position
of the Restatement seems logically untenable. If, immediately
upon the occurrence of the wrong, a cbnstructive trust arises with

23
its concomitant beneficial interest in the person wronged, is it

not illogical to conclude that such a beneficial property interest
need not be legitimized by specific enforceability unless the wrongdoer is insolvent, so that a concurrent legal remedy is of no avail?
The late Professor Gray's philosophy of a right resulting from an
available remedy is a decidedly practical one, and in accord with
historical sequence.2 4 Without entering upon a discussion of the
true character of the constructive trust device as "purely a remedial institution" as distinguished from a "substantive" one such
as an express trust22 suffice it to say that its specific performance
after insolvency presupposes the prior existence of something in
the nature of a genuine property interest in the beneficiary, else its
specific enforcement after insolvency would constitute an improper
2

preference.

In cases of contracts to sell land or unique chattels it is of
22
Restatement, Trusts (1935), sec. 202.
23"The beneficial interest in the property is from the beginning in the
person who has been wronged. The constructive trust arises from the situation in which he is entitled to the remedy of restitution, and it arises as
soon as that situation is created." 3 Scott, Trusts (1939) see. 462.4, p.
2320; see, also, Cann v. Barry, (1937) 299 Mass. 186, 188, 10 N. E. (2d)
88, 89.
24
Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law (1909).
2
-See Pound, Progress of the Law, 1918-1919: Equity, (1920) 33
Harv. L. Rev. 420-421; Cardozo, J., in Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration
Co., (1919) 225 N. Y. 380, 386, 122 N. E. 378, 380: "A constructive trust
is the formula through which the conscience of equity finds expression.
When property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of
the legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest,
equity converts him into a trustee." In accord with the "remedial" character of the constructive trust device, the Minnesota court has differentiated
between a constructive and an express trust in resepct of the commencement of the applicable statutory period of limitations, which does not require a repudiation of his trust by the constructive trustee as in the case
of the trustee of an express trust. See Stillwater & St. Paul R. R. Co. v.
City of Stillwater, (1896) 66 Minn. 176, 178, 68 N. W. 836, 837.
21See Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 160, comment f: "The
situation which arises where a constructive trustee is insolvent is to be
contrasted with the situation where a person who is under a merely personal liability becomes insolvent. In the latter case a claimant having no
beneficial interest in any property held by the defendant is not entitled to
specific enforcement of his claim, since the other claimants are in the same
situation and it is impossible specifically to enforce all the claims against
an insolvent person." McClintock, Equity (1936) 68.
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course the right of specific performance, based upon a presumed
inadequacy of the legal remedies, that creates an equitable property
interest in the vendee from the date of the contract. But in the
case of misappropriated or otherwise improperly acquired property, it can hardly be the possibility of the legal remedies becoming
inadequate through the insolvency of the wrongdoer that creates
an equitable property interest as of a time when the legal remedies
are perfectly adequate and may never become otherwise. It seems
logically impossible to limit the equitable remedy to the event of
the wrongdoer's insolvency, and at the same time to say it is the
existence of the equitable remedy that creates the prior property
interest that the fact of insolvency alone could not create. Equity
is not in the habit of creating preferences solely by virtue of the
only circumstances that result in their enforcement being prejudicial to the interests of others. It follows that in the present
connection the inadequacy of the legal remedies cannot possibly
be the basis of equitable interposition to create the beneficiary's
equitable property interest, and that, unless the remedy of specific
enforcement is available from the beginning, regardless of the
wrongdoer's solvency, the progression of reasoning necessarily
must be from the creation of the interest to its specific enforcement, rather than from the possibility of its specific enforcement
to its creation. As the Minnesota court has pointed out, the
principle of the constructive trust device "has its basis in the right
of property. '2 7 Equity thereby preserves the rightful owner's
beneficial interest from destruction through the improper acquisition of the legal title by another, and in certain instances transfers
such interest to a third person.2 8 Its specific enforcement in the
event of the legal remedies becoming inadequate through the
wrongdoer's insolvency obviously presupposes that equity created
the interest at the time of the original improper acquisition, regardless of the then adequacy of the legal remedies and upon some
other ground of equity than the inadequacy of such legal remedies.
Is it not anomalous for equity to create an interest that it
refuses to enforce until the circumstances of its creation have
changed? Why preserve a conception so foreign to realistic jurisprudence as that of an equitable property interest without a pres27

Twohy Mercantile Co. v. Melbye, (1899) 78 Minn. 357, 360, 81
N. W. 20, 21; see also, Shearer v. Barnes, (1912) 118 Minn. 179, 188,
136 N. W. 861, 864 ("born of and contemporaneously with the wrongful
diversion of the beneficiary's funds").
28
See above, note 8.
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ently enforceable equitable remedy? A requirement that the legal
remedies have become inadequate through the constructive
trustee's insolvency as a condition of the specific enforcement of
a constructive trust is in no way supported by the cases denying
specific recovery in equity of the mere possession of nonunique
chattels2 ' where the legal title has never left the rightful owner
and equity is being asked not to enforce an interest of its own
creation but merely to lend its extraordinary remedy in aid of a
strictly legal right. Neither is it supported by the cases holding
that fraud alone is not an adequate basis of equitable jurisdiction
where the only relief sought is in the form of money damages
available at law.30 Logically a requirement that the legal remedies
have become inadequate can have no application where the equitable interest sought to be enforced has had its origin independently
of a right of specific performance based solely on the inadequacy
of the legal remedies. Consistently with the argument that has
been advanced, the New York court of appeals has held that one
defrauded of his property by a nonfiduciary may specifically enforce a constructive trust of the proceeds although there is a
remedy at law available against a still solvent wrongdoer, the
theory of the court being that in the light of the more effective
character of equitable relief the less adequate legal remedy becomes substantially inadequate."
Such reasoning is sound
wherever the only basis of the equitable right sought to be enforced is not the inadequacy of the legal remedies. Otherwise
it is question-begging. The same reasoning is equally applicable
where the constructive trust is sought to be imposed upon the still
available misappropriated property itself as distinguished from its
proceeds. While the Minnesota court has not determined the
precise point under discussion, 2 it has been liberal in dispensing
20

16

See McClintock, Adequacy of Ineffective Remedy at Law, (1932)
REvIEW 233, 250-251 ; McClintock, Equity (1936) 67-68.
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3 See, for Example, Mackintosh v. Tracy, (1868) 4 Brewst. (Pa.) 59.
-'Falk v. Hoffman, (1922) 233 N. Y. 199, 201-202, 135 N. E. 243,
244; "Some remedy at law there is. It is not so complete or effective as
the remedy in equity. .

.

. Suing in equity, he may reach the proceeds

of the resale, securities and cash, though the price upon resale is found
to be greater than the value ... Equity will not be overnice in balancing
the efficacy of one remedy against the efficacy of another, when action
will baffle, and inaction may confirm, the purpose of the wrongdoer." See,
also, Jno. Dunlop's Sons, Inc., v. Dunlop, (1939) 172 Misc. Rep. 66, 68,
14 N. Y. S. 452, 456; Brown v. Father Divine, (1940) 173 Misc. Rep.
1029, 1030, 18 N. Y. S. 544, 546: "If the case is one of constructive trust,
an ancient
ground of equity jurisdiction is invoked."
32In Shearer v. Barnes, (1912) 118 Minn. 179, 188, 136 N. W. 861,
864, involving a breach of a fiduciary relation, the court stated: "The
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equity without a very meticulous inquiry into the adequacy of legal
remedies.33 It is submitted that the New York view is sound and
should be followed in this state.
With respect to the availability of relief by way of a constructive trust or an equitable lien upon wrongfully acquired property
or its proceeds, the Restatement has taken the position that as
against a conscious wrongdoer the two remedies are available in
the alternative,3 4 except where the wrongdoer has used such
property or its proceeds in making improvements upon other
property already owned by himself, in which case an equitable
lien is the only one of the two remedies available. 35 In some Minnesota cases, wherein by reference to this proposition either remedy
would have been available, counsel apparently were content with
a personal recovery secured by equitable lien, without pressing
the point of whether the circumstances were such that a constructive trust would have produced a more advantageous result.38 But
entirely in accord with the forepart of, the above proposition are
Shearer v. Barnes" and Cisewski v. Cisewski.3s In the former
the president of a trust company had made an improper loan to
himself of $10,000 of its funds, which, along with $2,000 of his
own money, he had expended in purchasing two lots for $28,000,
giving a purchase money mortgage for the balance. Title was
court may or may not enforce the trust, according to the equities of the
parties when its aid is sought; but the trust itself is a creature of equity,
born of and contemporaneously with the wrongful diversion of the beneficiary's
funds."
33
See Fryberger v. Berven, (1903) 88 Minn. 311, 92 N. W. 1125;
Lloyd v. Simons, (1906) 97 Minn. 315, 105 N. W. 902; McClintock, Adequacy of Ineffective Remedy at Law, (1932) 16 MINNESOTA LAW REvIEw
233, 251. In no Minnesota case has the court in any way suggested a
specific requirement of the wrongdoer's insolvency as a condition of imposing
a constructive trust.
34
Restatement, Restitution (1937) secs. 202, 210, 211. The option of
the beneficiary to pursue either remedy continues as against one who
acquires the property or its proceeds from the wrongdoer but is not a
bona fide purchaser for value, unless he has disposed of the property without notice of the beneficiary's interest, in which case he "is under a duty
either (a) to surrender the property which he acquired in exchange, or,
at his option, (b) to pay the value of the property which he originally
received, the property which he acquired in exchange being subject to an
equitable lien for such payment." Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 204;
see, also, sec. 208 (1), applying the forepart of the same proposition to a
third person receiving the consideration for a conscious wrongdoer's disposition of property belonging to another, and sec. 178, for a change of
position rule of somewhat broader application than the latter part.
85Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 206.
3
6See cases cited in note 19, above.
37(1912) 118 Minn. 179, 136 N. W. 861.
38 (1915) 129 Minn. 284, 152 N. W. 642.
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taken in the names of the wrongdoer and his wife, and the property became their homestead. The court held that by virtue of
the acquisition of the property in part with misappropriated funds
"a constructive trust then and there arose in favor of the trust
company, and the latter then and there became vested with a pro
tanto equitable estate in the property."39 It further stated that
"Undoubtedly the beneficiary of a constructive trust may elect
to reclaim his money, with interest, and, for this purpose, also to
pursue the property with a lien, instead of claiming a proportionate
interest therein; and it is equally well settled that, if he so elects,
he thereby waives the right to pursue the res as such."4' 0
However, the court held that there had been no such election
by virtue of the disposal by the trust company's receiver of certain
securities deposited by the wrongdoer at the time of making the
improper loan, which securities it was claimed had also been
purchased with the trust company's funds. 41 It concluded by sug31(1912) 118 Minn. 179, 186, 136 N. W. 861, 863. The court did not

state whether by a "pro tanto" interest it meant a five-sixths or a tentwenty-eighths interest, nor did it so much as consider the point, its
decision being in reversal of the trial court's refusal to impose any constructive trust interest at all. Presumably it meant a ten-twenty-eighths
interest. In the previous case of Martin v. Baldwin, (1883) 30 Minn. 537,
540, 16 N. W. 449, 450, where the entire down payment on the purchase

price of real estate had been made with the beneficiary's funds,,the balance

being secured by a purchase-money mortgage, the court, although holding
that the beneficiary's constructive trust interest in the land had been destroyed through subsequent conveyance to a bona fide purchaser for
value, stated obiter that it had never extended "to the entire interest in
the land, but only to the proportion represented by that which her money
put into the purchase bore to the entire consideration" The rule adopted by
the Restatement would have justified giving a five-sixths interest to the
beneficiary in Shearer v. Barnes and the whole interest to the beneficiary
in Martin v. Baldwin, subject in each case to the mortgage and the duty
of indemnifying the constructive trustee from personal liability for a corresponding proportion of the mortgage indebtedness. Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 210, comment f; see also note 14, above. Since the
question was not specifically considered by the court in either case, and
was entirely immaterial to the decision in Martin v. Baldwin, the Minnesota law cannot be said on the basis of these cases to be contrary to
the position of the Restatement in this respect. The question remains open
for determination.
40(1912) 118 Minn. 179, 189, 136 N. W. 861, 864.
41In respect of the holding that there had been no election, Professor
Bogert apparently regards the case as somewhat lenient toward the beneficiary. See 4 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935) sec. 867, p. 2519, note 89.
But the affairs between Barnes and the trust company were so scrambled that
perhaps all the case stands for in this respect is that a constructive trust
interest in specific property is not precluded by the state of the general
account between the parties. Both Professor Bogert and the Minnesota
court are in agreement that for an election to be conclusive "it must have
been made with full appreciation of the facts of the situation, and not
under mistake." 4 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935) sec. 867, pp. 25182519; Shearer v. Barnes, (1912) 118 Minn. 179, 189, 136 N. W. 861, 864.
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gesting something in the nature of an equitable lien for the amount
of a constructive trust interest, thus enabling the constructive
trustee to retain the whole property and preserve it from sale or
partition by paying the value of the constructive trust interest in
money. For it pointed out that
"It is entirely possible that upon a final adjustment of accounts
between the defendant Joseph U. Barnes and the corporation, and
the final settlement of the receivership, the defendants' home may
be left untouched, or at least preserved from sale, subject to a
charge or lien; such charge, however, to be for the value of the
corporation's interest therein, with rents and profits, 42 as dis-

tinguished
from the mere amount of the funds diverted with
' 43
interest.

Such a suggestion no doubt was motivated by solicitude for the
interest of the wrongdoer's wife in preserving their homestead,
rather than meant to enunciate a general principle applicable
equally to a proportionate constructive trust interest in business
property, where the beneficiary may desire to retain a proportionate interest in future profits not adequately included in the
present value of the trust res. 44 In Cisewski v. Cisewski45 the
42 The inclusion of rents and profits would have to be on the theory
that they are the direct product of the property held in constructive trust.
A person halding property subject to a constructive trust also "holds upon
a constructive trust anything received as a result of his holding the property. . . . Thus, if a person obtains shares of stock from the owner
by fraud, and gives the shares to a person who has no notice of the
fraud, the latter holds upon a constructive trust not only the shares
but any dividends on the shares received by him, whether in cash or in
shares or other property." Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 205, comment a. In Shearer v. Barnes, had there been rents and profits from the
property in the form of rentals received by the defendants from a third
person, which were still traceable in their original or a substituted form,
a constructive trust could thus have been imposed upon such rents and
profits in the same proportion as upon the property producing them; but
the constructive trust interest in the original property should not, it would
seem, be increased by the amount of the beneficiary's interest in such rents
and profits. If by "rents and profits" the court meant, as in all probability
it did, merely the amount of the rental value by which the defendants had
been benefited, but which they had not received in cash or other property,
there would be no basis for either enlarging the constructive trust interest in the original property or extending it to include anything else. At
the most the plaintiff would have had a personal claim for such rental
value, upon a principle similar to that whereby one cotenant excluding
the other from the premises owned in common is personally liable to the
latter for the reasonable rental value of his interest. See Sons v. Sons,
(1922) 151 Minn. 360, 362-363, 186 N. W. 811, 812.
43(1912) 118 Minn. 179, 198, 136 N. AV. 861, 868.
44In the principal case, when confronted with the suggested inequity
of driving the defendants from their home, the court said, (1912) 118
Minn. 179, 197, 136 N. W. 861, 867-868: "But the question of the existence of a constructive trust is entirely unaffected by the use which a
trustee ex maleficio makes of the property. . . . The very claim of a
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plaintiff's wife without his knowledge or consent had used a fund
of $4,337 in which he had a half interest in the purchase of an
hotel property. In a suit by plaintiff to impose a constructive
trust upon the property in his favor to the extent of an undivided
one-half interest, the Supreme Court reversed a decree limiting him
to a money judgment for $2,168.50, secured by an equitable lien
upon the whole property for that amount, stating that "plaintiff
had the absolute right to choose his own remedy, and . . . having

elected to reclaim the property in its substituted form, the court
was without power to deny him this relief and compel him to
take a remedy that he did not elect. 41, ' But the beneficiary's absolute right of choosing between the two remedies in such a situation
is not necessarily inconsistent with the final suggestion in Shearer
v. Barnes even as applied to business property.
The argument of the defendant in Cisewski v. Cisewski was
that a permanent estrangement beween the parties had made a
holding of the property as tenants in common "inconvenient and
provocative of additional dissension." To this the court replied
that if the parties should "find it inconvenient or impossible to own
real estate in common, the courts could afford relief, probably in a
partition sale."' 0 It is obvious that the aftermath of a decree for
a proportionate constructive trust interest, forcing the constructive
trustee and the beneficiary upon each other as tenants in common,
will frequently be the necessity of partition, which may be feasible
only by sale and partition of the proceeds. It would seem that in
many situations the same result might be best accomplished in the
decree imposing the constructive trust, by permitting the trustee
to retain the whole interest in the property upon payment to the
beneficiary of the present fair value, as found by the court, of the
latter's interest.47 Since the beneficiary is seeking equity, even
homestead in the property is a breach of the trust which arose out of the
manner of its acquisition." Compare Treacy v. Power, (1910) 112 Minn.
226, 239, 127 N. W. 936, 940: "In this state, for reasons of public policy,
the rule is positive and general that the trustee cannot mingle the trust
estate with his own, and deny to the cestui que trust the option of following the joint affairs, and availing himself of the proceeds the trustee
may have realized from his improper conduct."
45(1915) 129 Minn. 284, 152 N. W. 642.
4va(1915) 129 Minn. 284, 286, 152 N. W. 642, 643.
40(1915) 129 Minn. 284, 287, 152 N. W. 642, 643. But partition could
not be had of homestead property such as was involved in Shearer v.
Barnes, (1912) 118 Minn. 179, 136 N. W. 861. See Leach v. Leach, (1926)
167 Minn. 489, 491, 209 N. W. 636, 637.
47 As, for example, wherever the property is of the type, such as homestead property, that is not subject to partition, or where partition would
not prove feasible.
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though in the protection of a property interest, the court should
have considerable discretion as to the form of the relief afforded.' 8
The alternative suggested would not seem to be permissible where
the beneficiary has the whole interest in property held subject to a
constructive trust, or perhaps where his is the predominant interest, or where the constructive trustee is precluded from acquiring
the beneficiary's interest, even at a judicial sale, by virtue of the
continuing existence of a fiduciary relation between them.49 But
such a type of equitable lien as was suggested by the Minnesota
court in Shearer v.Barnes as an alternative method of enforcing
a constructive trust interest should not be confused, however, with
the ordinary type of equitable lien that is the alternative of a constructive trust.
In the subsequent case of Sieger v. Sieger ° the Minnesota
court delivered an opinion, through Wilson, C. J., that may be
somewhat misleading. The plaintiff's former wife, from whom
he was divorced at the time of the trial, had used $2,000 of plaintiff's money in the purchase for $3,400, she supplying the balance,
of property which was found to be worth $5,000 at the time of
the trial. The trial court imposed a constructive trust interest
in favor of the plaintiff to the extent of an undivided two-fifths
of the property.9 ' On such facts a constructive trust should obvi48
it should have still more discretion than in a subsequent partition
suit, in which it would be entitled, where the circumstances so demand,

to adjudge compensation in lieu of strict equality of partition. 2 Mason's
1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 9534. Where the property is of the type subject to
a partition suit, it would seem the court should be able to decree partition
or the equivalent thereof in the same proceeding in which the constructive
trust is first imposed. The beneficiary of a resulting trust has been permitted to maintain partition, see Prow v. Prow, (1893) 133 Ind. 340, 32
N. E. 1121, "on the apparent theory that the trust was passive, executed
by the statute of uses, and that therefore the plaintiff had an absolute interest and right to possession' 2 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935)
1426-1427.
49
For the extent to which a fiduciary is precluded from acquiring the
interest of his beneficiary at a judicial sale, see the discussion below, at pp.
699-701 of the text. But a constructive trustee is not a fiduciary, unless the
trust grew out of the breach of a previously existing fiduciary relation
between him and the beneficiary, and a co-owner of property subject to
partition is entitled to purchase the entire interest at a partition sale.
2 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 9542.
50(1925)
162 Minn. 322, 202 N. W. 742.
51
The trial court's decree cannot be rationalized as in reality imposing
an equitable lien rather than a constructive trust, since it specifically provided that "said defendant holds the title to such interest in said premises
in trust for plaintiff and that it be, and it is hereby, decreed that defendant
convey to said plaintiff such interest in said premises and, in case of
her failure so to do, that this decree stand in lieu thereof as a conveyance
of such interest by said defendant to said plaintiff." See page 109, Record
of Sieger v. Sieger, (1925) 162 Minn. 322, 202 N. W. 742.
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ously have been for an undivided ten-seventeenths interest,5 2
whereas an equitable lien would have subjected the entire property
to a security interest for $2,000. r 3 But the defendant alone appealed, on the untenable ground that a constructive trust will not
be imposed upon property that is only partially the product of the
misappropriation. The supreme court's opinion in affirmance is
likely to prove misleading, both through its failure to point out
the error in the proportion used by the trial court, and through
its statement that "a trust exists pro tanto the amount of the
funds used when the amount thereof is definite or constitutes an
54
aliquot part of the whole consideration."
That the amount of
the funds wrongfully used must be definite is implied in the requirement that they must be traceable into the product ;55 but that
they must constitute an aliquot part of the whole consideration for
the product of commingled funds is neither in accord with the
Restatement nor suggested by any other Minnesota case.5 6 It
seems most probable that the phrase italicized in the above quotation was used loosely by the court as illustrative of the term
"definite," and not as requiring that the amount of the misappropriated funds be contained in the entire amount of the commingled
funds an even number of times. Only by adopting such a construction of the language used is it believed correctly to represent
the Minnesota law.
In American Railway Express Co. v. Houle57 the Minnesota
court seems to have confused a constructive trust with an equitable
52

Restatement, Restitution (1937)

sec. 210 (2); in accord, Martin v.

Baldwin, (1883) 30 Minn. 537, 540, 16 N. W. 449, 450; Bitzer v. Bobo,
(1888) 39 Minn. 18, 21, -38 N. W. 609, 610; Shearer v. Barnes, (1912)
118 Minn. 179, 186, 136 N. W. 861, 863; Cisewskd v. CisewsK, (1915) 129

Minn.
284, 152 N. W. 642.
5
3Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 210 (1) ; see note 14, above.
54(1925) 162 Minn. 322, 325, 202 N. W. 742, 744 (italics supplied).
5
SSee below, section III of the text.
5GWhere a person voluntarily contributes money to a fund to be used
in the purchase of property, the fact that he contributes one-third or onefourth or some similar proportion of the total may tend to evidence his
intention to acquire a beneficial interest in the property when purchased.
An aliquot part rule may therefore have some legitimate application in
the law of resulting as distinguished from constructive trusts. "On the
other hand, where his money is wrongfully used in acquiring property, the
constructive trust which is imposed is imposed without regard to the intention of the parties. It is entirely immaterial therefore that the fraction repre-

senting the proportion of the claimant's money in the total fund is one with a
large numerator and a large denominator." Restatement, Restitution (1937)
sec. 210, comment e. In Bitzer v. Bobo, (1888) 39 Minn. 18, 38 N. W. 609,
the lowest fraction to which the constructive trust interest decreed by the
court could be reduced had a numerator of thirty-three and a denominator
of forty-one.
57(1926) 169 Minn. 209, 210 N. W. 889, 48 A. L. R. 1266.
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lien, and to have reached a result involving some difficulty of
reconciliation with the propositions of the Restatement. In this
case a wrongdoer had embezzled $8,756.53 from the plaintiff and
had commingled that amount with his own funds in a proportion
not stated. Thereafter he built a house, at a cost of $5,577.48,
upon a lot already owned by himself and his wife as tenants in
common. The cost of the house was defrayed by the giving of a
mortgage on the improved property for $2,575 and by payment of
the balance, $3,002.48, from the commingled funds. From the
same funds he subsequently paid $1,075 upon the principal of
the mortgage and $380.93 as interest, $60 for taxes upon the
property, and $167 in the building of a sidewalk.58 The trial
court, after rendering a personal judgment against the wrongdoer for $9,904.62, the total amount of the embezzlement with
interest and costs, further decreed that there be held "in trust for
plaintiff the title to the dwelling, together with an undivided onehalf interest in the land," to be sold by a receiver subject to the
mortgage "and subject, further, to the interest by right of subrogation which said Josephine Houle [the wife of the wrongdoer] may acquire in said trust property if and when she shall
pay said mortgage."5 9 The unsatisfactory character of the supreme
court's opinion in affirmance no doubt is partially attributable to
the fact that an appeal was taken only by the wife of the wrongdoer, and the only issue presented was Mrs. Houle's claim to a
one-half interest in the homestead on the ground that she was in
the position of an innocent purchaser in good faith.
Although both the trial and supreme court talked the language
of constructive trust, it seems clear that what was really imposed
was an equitable lien, and that the result, by relying upon some
apparent probabilities, may be reconciled upon the facts, although
not in the form of the decree, with the propositions of the Restatement. The Minnesota court had previously recognized that the
remedies of constructive trust and personal recovery against the
wrongdoer secured by equitable lien are mutually inconsistent and
mutually exclusive remedies, even where alternatively available.60
Therefore purporting to impose a constructive trust was entirely
inconsistent, under the prior Minnesota doctrine, with the fact of a
5
Pages 11-12 of Record of American Railway Express Co. v. Houle,
(1926) 169 Minn.209, 210 N. W. 889.
59
Page 17 of Record of American Railway Express Co. v. Houle,
(1926) 169 Minn.209, 210 N. W. 889.
6°Shearer v. Barnes, (1912) 118 Minn 179, 189, 136 N. W. 861, 864.
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personal judgment having been rendered against the wrongdoer
for the full amount of the embezzlement. The Minnesota court
had also previously recognized that a constructive trust interest
in property acquired with wrongfully commingled funds is limited
to the proportion of the beneficiary's enforced contribution to such
commingled funds.6 ' Yet in the case under discussion the trial
court had made no finding as to the amount of such proportion.
Neither the trial nor the appellate court can therefore be credited
with acquaintance with previous Minnesota decisions and at the
same time with the intent to impose a genuine constructive trust
as distinguished from an equitable lien. Furthermore, apart from
such decisions, since the court regarded the house as separable
from the land for the purpose of preserving the wife's interest in
the land, it would seem that it also remained separable from the
husband's interest in the land ;62 and if this be true, there would
be no basis for imposing a constructive trust upon the latter, to
the purchase price of which the commingled funds had in no way
contributed.
But if the value of the house and the husband's half interest
in the lot did not exceed the amount of the security interest to
which the plaintiff was entitled on an equitable lien theory, it
would follow that the court did not achieve an improper result by
incorrectly using the language of constructive trust. Considering
the case as imposing an equitable lien as distinguished from a
true constructive trust, under the rules of the Restatement such
lien should have attached to the entire property as a unit, subject
to the mortgage, for the amount of the commingled funds used in
the building of the house and the sidewalk, or for $3,169.48.3 In
addition, through the analogous equitable doctrine of subrogation,
the plaintiff should have been held entitled to the benefit of a
tax lien, superior to that of the mortgage, in the amount of $60,
and to the benefit of the mortgage, to the extent of $1,455.93, as
soon as the mortgagee should be paid the principal and interest
remaining due thereon. 64 Both of the liens thus acquired by
'Martin v. Baldwin, (1883) 30 Minn. 537, 540, 16 N. W. 449, 450;
Bitzer v. Bobo, (1888) 39 Minn. 18, 21, 38 N. W. 609, 610; Shearer v.
Barnes, (1912) 118 Minn. 179, 186, 136 N. W. 861, 863; Cisewski v.
Cisewski, (1915) 129 Minn. 284, 152 N. W. 642.
t-'Compare Hamlin v. Parsons, (1866) 12 Minn. 108 (Gil. 59), holding
that a mortgage lien upon a house and lot follows the house after its
removal, without the consent of the mortgagee, to another lot, but does not

attach
to such other lot.
03

Restatement, Restitution (1937) secs. 206, 208 (2).
04 Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 162, comment c, and 207; in
accord, as to subrogation to tax lien, Emmert v. Thompson, (1892) 49
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subrogation should attach equally to the wife's interest in the
land. The maximum amount of the plaintiff's security interest in
the property, acquired through equitable lien and subrogation,
would therefore not have exceeded $4,685.41.65 It is practically
certain that a forced sale of the house and the husband's halfinterest in the land would not have produced more than this
amount."6 But it would have been far more satisfactory had the
court not left us to rely on probabilities for the reconciliation of
the apparent inconsistency with the rules of the Restatement.
Furthermore, the form of the decree, by imposing a lien upon the
house and the husband's half-interest in the land for the full
amount of the personal judgment for $9,904.62, may have accomplished an injustice by preventing the wife from preserving their
homestead from sale by paying from her own funds the correct
67
amount of the plaintiff's lien.

The court specifically found that the wife had no knowledge
of her husband's wrongful use of the plaintiff's funds, but refused
to treat her as a bona fide purchaser of a half-interest in the house
for the reason that she had given no value therefor. Where the
wrongdoer uses misappropriated funds in making improvements
Minn. 386, 52 N. W. 31, 32 Am. St. Rep. 566; Elliott v. Tainter, (1903)

88 Minn. 377, 93 N. W. 124; see, also, Comment, (1937) 21 MINNESOTA
LAW REVIE W 218. To the extent of the tax lien the plaintiff by subrogation 65
should have acquired priority to the mortgage.
By the trial court's findings $4,891.73 was the total amount of the
commingled funds used in improving the property, paying the taxes, and
paying part of the principal and interest on the mortgage, but no other individual items appear than those stated in the text, which total $4,685.41.
See pages 10-12 of Record of American Railway Express Co. v. Houle,
(1926) 169 Minn. 209, 210 N. W. 889.
66
The total cost of the improved property was apparently $6,669.49,
arrived at by adding $925 as the cost of the naked lot, $5,577.48 as the
cost of the house, and $167 as the cost of the sidewalk. It is probable that
its fair market value, unincumbered, would not have exceeded that amount
at the time of the trial, although no finding was made as to its value. From
such amount there would have to be deducted the $1,500 still due on the
mortgage, with accrued interest. The value of the wife's interest in the
land, based on cost, would be $462.50, less the proportion of the mortgage
properly attributable to such interest. Taking into consideration also the
costs of sale, it is therefore practically certain, even with cost as the
basis of valuation and assuming that the forced sale of the house and the
husband's one-half interest in the land would realize their full proportionate
value, that the plaintiff could not have received more than the amount to
which it was entitled through an equitable lien and subrogation in accordance
with the rules of the Restatement.
6
7So long as there were no other higher bidders, the wife of course could
have protected her interest by purchasing the property at judicial sale for
the proper amount of plaintiff's lien, or less.

MINNESOTA LAW OF CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS

upon the property of a third person who is not a bona fide purchaser for value, the position of the Restatement is that if the third
person had notice an equitable lien for the full amount expended attaches to the property upon which the improvements are
made, whereas if the third person was without notice but also gave
no value, such property "is subject to an equitable lien for the
amount by which the value of the property is increased but not in
any case for more than the amount expended." 8 The trial court's
failure in the Houle Case to impose an equitable lien upon the
wife's undivided half-interest in the land may therefore perhaps
be reconciled with the rule of the Restatement by virtue of the
fact that any increase in the value of her half-interest owing to
the improvements was no doubt entirely wiped out by the imposition of a lien calculated to absorb the full value of the improvements in addition to that of the husband's half-interest in the
land."" It is also arguable that since the improvements subject to
the mortgage were entirely the product of the commingled funds,
the plaintiff was entitled in any event to the entire amount of the
realized sale value attributable to the improvements, even on the
equitable lien theory, so long as it did not exceed the entire amount
of the original embezzlement.7 0 But the separate sale of the dwelling together with the husband's undivided half-interest in the land,
as ordered by the trial court, was a method poorly calculated either
to realize their full value for the plaintiff or to preserve for the
wife the full value of her own original undivided half-interest in
the land. It is submitted that it would have been much more
satisfactory had the court, in accord with the rule of the Restatement, imposed an equitable lien upon the entire lot as improved
and ordered its sale as a unit, apportioning the price realized as
accurately as possible between the value attributable to the land
and the value attributable to the improvements, and awarding onehalf of the portion of the price thus ascertained to be attributable
to the land without the improvements to the wife in lieu of her
former interest in the land. 71
08

Restatement, Restitution (1937), sec. 208 (2), comment b.
The court apparently permitted her to retain a half-interest in the
sidewalk built with the commingled funds.
70
See the discussion of tracing principles in note 14, above.
7'For further discussion see Comment, (1939) 23 MINNEsoTA LAW
REViEw 706, 707, where the Houle case is cited, improperly it is believed,
for a proposition, contrary to that of the Restatement, that where in such a
situation "the defrauded party requests the constructive trust remedy, there
is no logical basis for denying him such relief."
69
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I.

SPECIFIC CATEGORIES OF CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING THE
IMPOSITION OF A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST OR AN
EQUITABLE LIEN

A. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY RELATION.-According to the
Minnesota court, "The doctrine of constructive trust arising from
abuse of fiduciary relations is too familiar to require exposition." 72
The existence of such a relation dispenses with any requirement
that the constructive trustee shall have been a conscious wrongdoer,73 or that there have been any fraud, duress, mistake, or undue
influence ;74 but the beneficiary is still entitled at his option to impose an equitable lien where that, coupled with a cause of action
in personam, will secure a larger measure of recovery.7 , There
are of course varying degrees of fiduciary relations, and that
which constitutes a violation of one does not necessarily constitute a violation of another of lesser degree. At the top of the
hierarchy of such relations are those which exist between the
trustee and beneficiary of an express trust,7 8 or between a principal
and an agent ;" at the bottom are those which, strictly speaking,
are not fiduciary at all, but involve a degree of confidence, justifiable reliance, or inequality, the taking advantage of which may be
2

7 City of Minneapolis v. Canterbury, (1913) 122 Minn. 301, 307, 142
N. W. 812, 814. See, also, Scott, The Trustee's Duty of Loyalty, (1936)
49 Harv. L. Rev. 521.
73Owing to its liberality of cross-reference the Restatement may appear
to be somewhat misleading in this respect. For example, in section 190,
comment c, it is stated that where a fiduciary exchanges property held subject to constructive trust for other property, "the beneficiary is entitled to
enforce a constructive trust or equitable lien upon the property so acquired
in exchange, under the rules stated in secs. 202-215." The sections referred
to, however, do not permit the constructive trust remedy as distinguished
from an equitable lien as against one who has disposed of the property of
another without knowledge that the disposition was wrongful (see section
203), or as against an innocent donee of property subject to a constructive
trust, who has disposed of it without notice of the trust interest (see section
204). But section 198 adopts a broad rule, apparently in no way dependent
upon wrongful intent, that "Where a fiduciary in violation of his duty to
the beneficiary disposes of property entrusted to him as fiduciary, he holds
any property received in exchange upon a constructive trust for the beneficiary ;" and under section 201 (1) the constructive trust continues to attach
to the property improperly transferred to a third person "if he gave no value
or if 4he had notice of the violation of duty."
7 See Tilleny v. Wolverton, (1891) 46 Minn. 256, 257-258, 48 N. W. 908.
75
Restatement, Trusts (1935) sec. 202 (1), comment a: in accord,
Shearer v. Barnes, (1912) 118 Minn. 179, 189, 136 N. W. 861, 864; Restatement, Agency (1933) sec. 407, comment d.
76So far as the law of fiduciary relations is concerned, the relation of
an administrator or executor to the beneficiaries of his estate, or of a
guardian to his ward, may be regarded for practical purposes as one of express trust. See 3 Scott, Trusts (1939) sec. 495.
77
Restatement, Agency (1933) secs. 387-398.
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held to produce the same consequences as though they were truly
fiduciary.78 The general principle that a violation of any such
relation justifies the imposition of a constructive trust or an
equitable lien does not vary, but the circumstances that constitute
a violation may vary with the nature and degree of fiduciary character of the particular relation involved.
Cases of the type already considered, where one person's
property without his consent has been wrongfully appropriated or
used for the benefit of another, may involve the breach of a
fiduciary relation,79 but in those and other similar cases the existence of such a relation is not essential to the imposition of a
constructive trust or an equitable lien. In particular instances it
may be the existence of such a relation that enables the wrongdoer
to acquire or to transfer the legal title to the misappropriated property,8 1' but the general principle enunciated by the decisions is of
broader application. For the present we shall be considering cases
in which a constructive trust or an equitable lien would not be
imposed but for the existence of a relation of a fiduciary or otherwise confidential character.
A fiduciary may not deal at arm's length with his beneficiary
in respect of matters within the scope of the relation. The principle is equally applicable to situations in which there is no res to
be pursued by the constructive trust or equitable lien device. Thus
an attorney may not validly contract with one already his client
8
for more than a reasonable compensation for his services. ' If
by overreaching the fiduciary character of the relation the attorney
has procured anything from the client that can be traced, the
76"Nor is the application of the rule confined to a particular class of
persons, as guardians, solicitors, attorneys, etc. It applies universally to all
The duty in relation to the property
who come within its principles ....
need not be a legal one such as the law will enforce a performance of. If it
be a moral duty, growing out of confidence and trust reposed by one and
accepted by another in business relations and transactions, it is enough."
King7 v. Remington, (1886) 36 Minn. 15, 26, 29 N. W. 352, 358.
0As in Shearer v. Barnes, (1912) 118 Minn. 179, 136 N. W. 861. For
other instances of the misappropriation of trust funds in which, however, the
existence of the fiduciary relation would seem not to have been essential for
the imposition of a constructive trust, see Rich v. Rich, (1867) 12 Minn.
468 (Gil. 369) ; Martin v. Baldwin, (1883) 30 Minn. 537, 16 N. W. 449.
8OAs in American Railway Express Co. v. Houle, (1926) 169 Minn.
209, 210 N. W. 889, 48 A. L. R. 1266, but the same result would have been
reached in that case had the funds of the plaintiff been larcenously taken
by one not occupying a fiduciary relation to it.
81
See Comment, (1936) 20 MINNESOTA LAW REvIEw 429. As to right
of client to discharge attorney with or without cause, subject to liability for
reasonable value of attorney's services, see Krippner v. Matz, (1939) 205
Minn. 497, 287 N. W. 19.
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latter is entitled to have a constructive trust or an equitable lien
imposed thereon. 2 In general it may be said that for dealings
between a fiduciary and his beneficiary to be entirely valid, the
latter must have been of competent age and understanding,
his consent must have been freely given, uninfluenced by the
fiduciary and after full disclosure of all pertinent facts, and the
transaction must have been fair and reasonable.88 In all the
instances "where the law infers from the relations of the parties
the probability of undue influence on the part of the party having
dominion or ascendancy over another, it requires that the influence
in fact exercised shall be exerted for the benefit of the person subject to it, and not for the benefit of the party possessing it."' 4 The
purpose is to remove temptation from a fiduciary's path.85
The most frequent instances of the violations of fiduciary relations have involved the sale by a fiduciary, to his trust estate or to
6
his beneficiary, of property -that belonged to himself individually,
or, conversely, the purchase by a fiduciary individually of property that belonged to his trust estate or to his beneficiary.87 Where
the fiduciary is the seller and remains solvent, and the beneficiary
or trust estate has parted merely with money, the beneficiary is
frequently content with personal recovery of the purchase price, so
that many of such cases fall under the head of ordinary rescission.
They are nevertheless illustrative of the circumstances under which
a constructive trust or an equitable lien are equally available remedies so long as the purchase price or consideration paid by the beneficiary is traceable either in specie or into its identifiable proceeds!"
Upon ordinary principles of rescission the beneficiary is also
entitled to a lien upon the property received by him from the
fiduciary, which he must otherwise restore, until he has received
repayment of the purchase price."
Thus a guardian may not unload upon his ward's estate a
mortgage held by himself,90 nor one held by a bank of which he
82

Compare Tancre v. Reynolds, (1886) 35 Minn. 476, 29 N. W. 171
action proceeding upon theory of rescission).
(replevin
83
Restatement, Restitution (1937), sec. 191; in accord, Turner v. FryN. W. 1133, 109 N. W. 229.
berger,
8 4 (1906) 99 Minn. 236, 107
Ashton v. Thompson, (1884) 32 Minn. 25, 42, 18 N. W. 918, 923.
856King v. Remington, (1886) 36 Minn. 15, 26, 29 N. W. 352, 358.
(1937), sec. 193.
8- 7Restatement, Restitution
Restatement, Restitution (1937), sec. 192.
88
For the interrelation of the law of rescission and reformation with the
doctrine of constructive trusts, see Restatement, Restitution (1937), sec.

comment k.
160, 89
Restatement, Contracts (1932), sec. 482; see, also, Note, (1923) 7
MiNNEsoTA LAW REviEw 231.
9
OIn re Granstrand, (1892) 49 Minn. 438, 52 N. W. 41.
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was "president and general manager" and "altogether in control." ' 1
By the common law in this state a trust company cannot lawfully
transfer securities owned by itself to an estate of which it is
trustee, even though such securities are of the kind that would
otherwise constitute proper trust investments ;92 and the statutes
regulating trust companies and trust investments93 have been held
not to have changed the common law in this respect. 94 In Bjorngaard v. Goodhue County Bank,95 it was held that a sale by cor-

porate directors of their own property to their corporation is
voidable regardless of the absence of any element of unfairness, but may be ratified by the votes, constituting a majority,
of the same individuals as shareholders, provided the transaction is fair and reasonable. 98 It is probably the present
Minnesota law, however, that most transactions between a
private corporation and its directors are valid even without
shareholder ratification provided they are fair and reasonable, with
the burden of proving this essential prerequisite of validity upon
the interested directors. 97 Where a contract with a public corporation is void because of the personal interest therein of a member
of its governing body,98 the corporation is held in this state to be
quasi contractually liable for the reasonable value of benefits re91

Ottawa Banking & Trust Co. v. Crookston State Bank, (1931)

Minn.2 22, 239 N. W. 666, noted (1932) 30 Mich. L. Rev. 982.

185

D St. Paul Trust Co. v. Strong, (1901) 85 Minn. 1, 88 N. W. 256;
Smith v. Tolversen, (1934) 190 Minn. 410, 252 N. W. 423; Malcolmsen v.
Goodhue County Nat'l Bank, (1936) 198 Minn. 562, 272 N. W. 157, noted
(1937) 21 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 737.
-i2
Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sees. 7735-7736, 7738.
14Larson v. Security Bank & Trust Co., (1929) 178 Minn. 209, 224
N. W. 235, 226 N. W. 697; Kelly v. First Minneapolis Trust Co., (1929)
178 Minn. 215, 226 N. W. 696, noted (1930) 14 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEw
308. It is now specifically provided by statute, however, that corporate trustees may invest trust funds in fractional parts of securities and may commingle funds of separate trusts for investment purposes. 3 Mason's Minn.
Stat. (1940 Supp.) sec. 7735; sec. Note, Minnesota Legislation of 1936 and
1937, (1938) 22 MINNESOTA LAW REviw 219, 249.
V5(1892) 49 Minn. 483, 52 N. W. 48.

913While the majority shareholders of a corporation are not subject to
the same fiduciary obligation as the directors, they may not oppress the

minority. See Seitz v. Union Brass & Metal Mfg. Co., (1922) 152 Minn.
460, 462, 189 N. W. 586, 587.
72Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. v. Peteler Car Co., (1916) 132 Minn.
277, 282-285, 156 N. W. 255, 257-259. The statement in Jones v. Morrison,
(1883) 31 Minn. 140, 148, 16 N. W. 854, 858, that the salaries of officers of
a corporation fixed by themselves as directors are "prima facie voidable at
the election of the corporation or of a stockholder," can mean nothing more
than that the burden of proving them to be reasonable in amount is upon the
interested directors. On salaries of corporate officers, see, also, Barrett v.
Smith, (1932) 185 Minn. 596, 242 N. W. 392; Keough v. St. Paul Milk
Co., (1939) 205 Minn. 96, 285 N. W. 809.
Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 10305.
t'82
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ceived and not restored, so that, to whatever extent it would be
quasi contractually liable it obviously may not recover the purchase
price already paid by it.09
An agent authorized to purchase property for his principal may
not purchase property of his own for that purpose, in the absence
of the principal's consent after full disclosure of the facts.100 Nor
may he in respect of the same transaction act as agent for both
02
the situation
buyer and seller.101 In Donnelly v. Cuinningham,"
Cunningparty.
a
third
of
the
interposition
by
complicated
was
lot
that he
a
selected
for
Donnelly,
property
to
buy
ham, an agent
proand
one
Wentworth,
honestly believed to belong entirely to
Cunningham
fact
In
latter.
cured a deed to Donnelly from the
was himself the equitable owner of an undivided half-interest in
the whole lot, and the record holder of the legal title of a part.
Upon discovery of this fact Donnelly refused to accept a deed
tendered by Cunningham of his interest, and sued both him and
Wentworth to recover the purchase price already paid, which
apparently had been divided equally between Cunningham and
Wentworth. The court held him entitled to recover one-half of
the purchase price from Cunningham, but nothing from Wentworth, on the ground that the latter was not a partner of Cunningham and did not otherwise share the fiduciary relation toward
Donnelly. Canty, J., in a separate opinion, refused to concur
in the reason given for exempting Wentworth from liability. He
contended that if "the title to the whole lot was in Wentworth, as
he had supposed it was," Wentworth alone and not plaintiff would
have been charged with notice of Cunningham's interest, so that
the "transaction, on its face, would show a sale by Wentworth
5
991
ares v. Janutka, (1936) 196 Minn. 87, 264 N. W. 222, noted (1936)
20 MIrNESOTA LAW REVIEW 564; see, also, Comment, (1939) 23 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 239. The Minnesota court has been more liberal than the
majority in allowing quasi contractual recovery against municipal corporations. See, particularly, Wakely v. County of St. Louis, (1931) 184 Minn.
N. W. 103, noted (1932) 17 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 101.
613, 240
l 0 Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 193; in accord, Friesenhahn v.
Bushnell, (1891) 47 Minn. 443, 50 N. W. 597; Donnelly v. Cunningham,
(1894) 58 Minn. 376, 59 N. W. 1052. For similar reasons an agent's general authority to bind his principal does not permit him, without his principal's express consent, to effect a novation of obligors whereby the principal
is substituted for the agent as the obligor of a prior contract, Williams v.
Journal Printing Co., (1890) 43 Minn. 537, 45 N. W. 1133; and the president of a corporation may not properly execute in its name an accommodation note for the benefit of a firm of which he is a member. Third Nat'l
Bank101of St. Paul v. Marine Lumber Co., (1890) 44 Minn. 65, 46 N. W. 145.
See Crump v. Ingersoll, (1890) 44 Minn. 84, 46 N. W. 141, same
case (1891) 47 Minn. 179, 49 N. W. 739.
102(1894) 58 Minn. 376, 59 N. W. 1052.
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alone to plaintiff, and Wentworth would have no right to presume
that plaintiff understood it to be anything else.

' 10 3

He concurred

specially in the result, however, on the ground that since the record
title to a part of the land had been in Cunningham, the plaintiff
likewise was charged with notice of Cunningham's interest, and
that therefore the fact that Wentworth had "supposed the transaction to be such as in law would constitute a constructive fraud
will not make it such, or make him liable." 104 But if the record
title being in the fiduciary is not the equivalent of such full disclosure as will validate the transaction as against the fiduciary,
as it obviously was properly held not to be, it is difficult to discover
any reason why it should have that effect as against a third person
charged with notice both of the fiduciary relation and of the
fiduciary's interest. The refusal of rescission as against Wentworth seems inconsistent with the theory underlying the rules of
the Restatement.' " The result of partial rescission was a judicial
making of a new contract for the parties, whereby a single indivisible contract for the sale of the whole interest in the lot was
transformed into one for the sale of an undivided half-interest.
No element of consideration for Wentworth justified a result so
out of accord with equitable principles generally, and so fraught
with the likelihood of future inconvenience and litigation as is the
average enforced cotenancy. Had Donnelly paid an indivisible
property consideration the result of decreeing only partial rescission would have been the creation of a forced cotenancy in both
properties.
In the converse situation where the fiduciary is the purchaser,
the Minnesota court has stated, in accord with the Restatement,' 0
that the "rule which disables one occupying a confidential or
fiduciary relation, in respect to property the subject of a sale,
from purchasing for his own benefit, and regarding him as a
trustee if he do purchase, is absolute, and looks to no other facts
07
than the relation and the purchase.'1

Thus an agent to sell

property for the owner may not become his own undisclosed principal in its purchase, 0 4 or an undisclosed member of a purchasing
103(1894) 58 Minn. 376, 380, 59 N. W. 1052, 1054.

-04(1894) 58 Minn. 376, 381, 59 N. W. 1052, 1054.
20 -See Restatement, Restitution (1937), sec. 201 (1), which would
clearly seem to call for a different result had Donnelly sought to impose a
constructive trust upon the purchase money paid by him to Cunningham
and Wentworth.
10 GRestatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 192; Restatement, Agency
sec. 389.
(1933),
20 7King v. Remington, (1886) 36 Minn. 15, 25, 29 N. W. 352, 358.
lOsSee Smitz v. Leopold, (1892) 51 Minn. 455, 53 N. W. 719.
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syndicate. 0 9 It is of no consequence that the identity of the purchaser is otherwise immaterial to the seller, or that the latter may
have specifically authorized the agent to sell to anyone at a fixed
price which has in fact been paid."z0 The consequences of such
a violation of a fiduciary relation are that the agent is not entitled
to a commission for the sale, whether the principal affirms or
disaffirms it,"' and that the principal is entitled, at his option, to
(a) recover the specific property or its identifiable proceeds except
as against bona fide purchasers for value or others who have innocently received and disposed of the property or its proceeds without
notice of the principal's constructive trust interest therein;"32 or
(b) hold the agent personally accountable for its value as a converter, 113 with an equitable lien upon the property or its proceeds
in the agent's hands ;114 or (c) impose a constructive trust upon,
or hold the agent personally accountable for, any profits that may
have been derived by him from the transaction" 5 or from subsequent dealings with the property."16
The availability of and an advantageous choice from among the
above alternatives depends in the first place upon a combination of
such variable factors as the extent to which the original property
is still traceable, whether it has gone up or down in value, whether
subsequent dealings with it by the fiduciary have proved profitable,
the extent to which his profits are still traceable, and whether he is
' 09 Tilleny v. Wolverton, (1891) 46 Minn. 256, 48 N. W. 908.
iloSee Hegenmyer v. Marks, (1897) 37 Minn. 6, 32 N. W. 785, 5 Am.
St. Rep. 808.
."Restatement, Agency (1933) sec. 469; in accord, see Webb v. Paxton,
(1887) 36 Minn. 532, 32 N. W. 749; cf. Darrt v. Sonnesyn, (1902) 86 Minn.
55, 902 N. W. 115.
1 Restatement, Restitution (1937) secs. 201 (1), 204.
"IsFarrand v. Hurlburt, (1862) 7 Minn. 477 (Gil. 383, 385) (an agent,
in whose hands money is placed by the principal to be located or invested in
the name of the principal, is guilty of conversion if he invests it in his own
name). Such an action of course is limited to misdealings with personal
property. But the agent is also contractually liable for a breach of the implied obligations of the relation. Restatement, Agency (1933) sec. 399 (a).
"14Restatement, Agency (1933) sec. 407, comment d.
115 Schick v. Suttle, (1905) 94 Minn. 135, 136-137, 102 N. W. 217: "It is
elementary, and a rule of universal application, that all profits and benefits
accruing from the act of an agent, whether resulting from the performance
or violation of his duty, belong to the principal, and not to the agent." Recovery from a third person of the property wrongfully disposed of or its
proceeds or value is not inconsistent with further recovery from the agent
of his profits. Restatement, Agency (1933) sec. 407 (2), comment e: "If an
agent has violated a duty of loyalty to the principal so that the principal is
entitled to profits which the agent has thereby made, the fact that the principal has brought an action against a third person and has been made whole
by such action does not prevent the principal from recovering from the agent
the profits which the agent has made."
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personally solvent. But it apparently may depend also, in this
state, upon whether third persons, even though not bona fide purchasers for value, have entered the picture. This is well illustrated
by the Minnesota case of Newell v. Cochran.11 T In the prior
case of Hegemnyer v. Marks"5 the court had held, in accord with
the Restatement, that a third person acquiring the property of a
principal through an agent's breach of his fiduciary obligation, with
notice thereof, is in no better position than the agent. 119 So long
as the transaction constitutes a violation of the agent's fiduciary
obligation of which the third person has notice, it matters not
whether the latter acquires the property directly from the principal, as in Hegenmyer v. Marks, or from the agent who has first
wrongfully acquired it for himself. 20 If such a third person subsequently disposes of the property, a constructive trust will attach
to its identifiable proceeds in his hands.' 2 '
The significant facts of Newell v. Cochran were as follows:
The two plaintiffs and defendant Holdridge had purchased a tract
of land for $70,000 for the purpose of reselling it at a profit. Title
was taken in the name of plaintiff Newell, but each member of the
venture was to have a one-third interest in the property and in
the profits derived from its resale. Thereafter defendants Cochran & Walsh and one Moore formed a syndicate for the purpose of
purchasing the land. They first negotiated secretly with Holdridge, and an arrangement was made whereby $74,000 should be
offered for the property, but that, if the offer were accepted by the
plaintiffs, Holdridge, in lieu of one-third of the named price at
which he was unwilling to sell his interest, "should then, at his
option, either take a one-third interest in the syndicate, or sell his
one-third interest in the land to the syndicate for such higher price
as should thereafter be agreed upon.'

22

The plaintiffs accepted

the offer, urged strongly to do so by Holdridge, who concealed
"16 See Smitz v. Leopold, (1892) 51 Minn. 455, 53 N. W. 719.
117(1889) 41 Minn. 374, 43 N. W. 84.
118(1887) 37 Minn. 6, 32 N. W. 785, 5 Am.St. Rep. 808.

119 Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 201 (1); compare Risvold v.
Gustafson, (1940) 207 Minn. 359, 292 N. W. 103 (third person, although
participating in breach of a fiduciary relation, allowed to retain legitimate
benefits arising from his own antecedent and independently acquired interest
in the subject-matter) with Risvold v. Gustafson, (Minn. 1941) 296 N. W.
411 (third person, who was not a director, "held because, without value and
with knowledge of the facts, he shared in the 'rake-off' improperly taken by"
the directors).
' 2 ORestatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 201 (1), comment a.
"-'Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 204, comment c; sec. 208 (1),
comment a; and see 3 Scott, Trusts (1939) sec. 508.
122(1889) 41 Minn. 374, 376, 43 N. W. 84.
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from them his secret agreement with the purchasing syndicate.
Thereafter Holdridge sold to the syndicate his one-third interest
"at a price in excess of that for which the interests of the plaintiffs
were thus procured."' 12 As of the time of the original purchase
by the syndicate, the property was found to have been worth no
more than the $74,000. It was later "sold by the syndicate at a
profit, some other improvements having tended to increase its
value." 124

Holdridge did not share in such profit.

The court held

him personally liable to his two associates in the first venture "to
the extent of two-thirds of the price realized by him upon the sale
to the syndicate in excess of his proper share of the price for
which the sale by Newell was made.'

12

1

Cochran & Walsh were

held to be subject to no liability at all-neither for the profits they
had reaped nor for the proper accounting by Holdridge to the
plaintiffs.

The court stated, through Dickinson, J. :121

"In no view of this case could Cochran & Walsh have been held
responsible to the plaintiffs for the sum for which the syndicate
afterwards sold the property in excess of that for which they
purchased it. To such a claim it would be enough to answer that
the property was actually sold to the syndicate; that this action
is predicated upon the fact of such a sale having been made; and
that damages for any fraudulent conduct inducing the plaintiffs
to sell would be measured by the difference between the price for
which the sale was made by the plaintiffs and the actual value of
the property. 1

7

.

. . We will assume-what the plaintiffs claim

should have been found by the court as a fact in the case-that
Cochran & Walsh knew of the relations subsisting between
Hold1 28

It must
ridge and the plaintiffs with respect to the property.
123(1889) 41 Minn. 374, 377, 43 N. W. 84, 85.
124(1889) 41 Minn. 374, 377, 43 N. W. 84, 85. Restatement, Trusts
(1935) sec. 291 (3), comment p, takes the position that a third person is
not entitled to reimbursement for the value of improvements made by him
upon property acquired through the breach of an express trust with knowledge thereof. The same rule would seem to be applicable to a similar transferee of property acquired through the breach of any strictly fiduciary relation. See Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 177, comment c.
125(1889) 41 Minn. 374, 377, 43 N. W. 84, 85.
126(1889) 41 Minn. 374, 380-381, 43 N. W. 84, 86.
27
The court apparently assumed that the liability of Cochran & Walsh
depended upon the ordinary principles of fraud applicable to transactions
between parties dealing at arm's length, and that therefore the "out of pocket
loss" measure of damages .of the tort action of deceit in this state would
govern. Compare Restatement, Agency (1933) sec. 314: "A person who
receives from an agent of another the principal's things, with notice that
the agent is thereby committing a breach of a fiduciary duty to the principal,
holds the things thus acquired as a constructive trustee or, at the election
of the
128principal, is subject to liability to him for their value."
By the trial court's finding "Cochran & Walsh knew that Holdridge
was interested with the plaintiffs in the land, but . . . it does not appear
that they knew the precise character of his relation with the plaintiffs,
whether as a partner or tenant in common." (1889) 41 Minn. 374, 377,
43 N. W. 84, 85.
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be borne in mind that, since the plaintiffs realized all that the
property was worth, so that they can recover no substantial damages upon the ground that the sale was induced by fraud, their
right of recovery is necessarily limited to the excess of the price
129
received by Holdridge over that received by the plaintiffs.

. . .

But Cochran & Walsh and their associates were purchasers only.
They stood in no relation of trust towards the common owners
of the property, nor were they bound to see to it that Holdridge
accounted to the plaintiffs for what he received, and that he paid
to them their proper shares .... It can hardly be that the very fact

that the purchasers paid this larger sum to Holdridge as the price
of the property than they had paid to the others, creates a liability
to pay so much of the purchase price a second time to the plaintiffs, or that by reason of having made such payment they are
answerable for the equitable distribution of the fund by Holdridge."
It would seem that the court, as in Donnelly v. Cunningham, 30
overlooked the fact that a third person need not share a fiduciary
relation in order to be subjected to liabilities as a consequence of
his participation with notice in the fiduciary's breach of trust, or
to be precluded from profiting therefrom. Assuming, as the court
did, that "Cochran & Walsh knew of the relations subsisting
between Holdridge and the plaintiffs with respect to the property,"'13 it is impossible to agree with the court's sweeping assertion that in no view of the case could Cochran & Walsh "have
been held responsible to the plaintiffs for the sum for which the
syndicate afterwards sold the property in excess of that for which
they purchased it." It was specifically found that the sale by the
plaintiffs of their two-thirds interest was induced by the advice
of Holdridge and his violation of his fiduciary obligation. The
relief asked by the plaintiffs' complaint was that the sale to the
syndicate "be adjudged fraudulent and void as to these plaintiffs,"
that "as to the undivided two-thirds of said land said defendants
be adjudged to have acquired and held the same as trustees for
these plaintiffs," and that "said defendants be adjudged to account
-Italics supplied.
130(1894) 58 Minn. 376, 59 N. W. 1052 (for facts and discussion see
above, at pp. 692-693 of the text).
13 'On the basis of such an assumption it could well be inferred that
the syndicate was cognizant of Holdridge's intent not to account to the
plaintiffs for their proper share of the additional profits realized by him from
the secret agreement for the subsequent sale of his one-third interest. Thus
on ordinary trust principles it should follow that Cochran & Walsh ought
to have been held liable to plaintiffs for a proper accounting by Holdridge
to them. See Restatement, Trusts (1935) sec. 321; 2 Mechem, Agency (2d
ed. 1914) sec. 2137.
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to these plaintiffs of and concerning said lands."'13

2

On the other

hand the complaint did not specifically ask for the type of relief
awarded by the court as against Holdridge. Therefore the action
obviously was not in affirmance of the sale to the syndicate, or
predicated upon the fact of a valid sale to it having been made.
The syndicate acquired the legal title to the plaintiffs' two-thirds
interest subject to a constructive trust in their favor. 133 Legal title
to the specific property apparently could not have been restored to
the plaifitiffs, for the reason that in all probability the resale by
the syndicate had been to bona fide purchasers for value. But
for the sale to stand so far as the passage of legal title is concerned
is not disconsonant with an impugnment of its propriety for the
purpose of imposing a constructive trust upon the proceeds of the
specific property, or of securing an accounting for the profits of
resale. 3 4
Furthermore, since it was through Holdridge's breach of his
fiduciary obligation that the property was conveyed to the syndicate, and since it is well settled that all profits arising from the
acts of the agent, whether resulting from a proper performance of
his duties or a violation thereof, belong to the principal,8 5 it would
seem that the relief awarded against Holdridge for a two-thirds
share of the additional price realized from the sale of his one-third
interest to the syndicate, was not necessarily inconsistent with the
relief asked against Cochran & Walsh for an accounting of their
profits derived from the resale of plaintiffs' two-thirds interest. It
was through Holdridge's breach of his fiduciary obligation that the
plaintiffs' two-thirds interest was improperly acquired by the
syndicate, and the sale of his own one-third interest to the syndicate was separately effected. Cochran & Walsh were therefore
not further concerned with the adjustment of the equities between
the plaintiffs and Holdridge,23 6 and it was no concern of the plaintiffs that Holdridge had no claim to the share of the profits derived
by Cochran & Walsh from the resale of his one-third interest.
Cochran & Walsh were obviously entitled to a credit for the
282Newell v. Cochran, (1889) 41 Minn. 374, 43 N. W. 84, Paper Book,
Appellant's Brief, p. 11.
' 33
Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 201 (1).
134 Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 160, comment h; see, also, 3
Scott,33Trusts (1939) sec. 508.2.
Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 197; this section was expressly
adopted by the Minnesota court in Risvold v. Gustafson, (Minn. 1941) 296
N. W.36411; see, also, Snell v. Goodlander, (1903) 90 Minn. 533, 97 N. W. 421.
1 Except possibly as a guarantor of Holdridge's accounting for his excess share of the profits. See footnote 131, above.
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amount they had paid for any interest for which they should be
held accountable."' A result whereby the plaintiffs received twothirds of the profits of the sale to the syndicate of Holdridge's onethird interest, and also might have secured all the profits of the
resale by the syndicate of their two-thirds interest, could have
been avoided by deducting the amount actually recovered from
Holdridge from the amount otherwise recoverable from Cochran &
Walsh. No injustice would thereby have been done Holdridge,
since on no theory was he entitled to a share in the profits derived
by Cochran & Walsh from the resale by the syndicate of any part
of the land. In any event, such dilemma as may have been thought
by the court to exist as between the two forms of relief was presented not by the plaintiffs' complaint, but by the court's awarding
them a form of relief for which they did not specifically ask, in
place of that for which they did ask and to which, it is submitted,
they were properly entitled. The decision as to Cochran & Walsh
is supportable only on the theory that the state of their knowledge
of Holdridge's violation of his fiduciary obligation was not in
fact such as the appellate court assumed it to be."13 The case
is the third illustration thus far in the discussion of confusion in
the Minnesota law and lack of entire accord with the Restatement
as to the availability of the equitable remedies here being considered, as against third persons who are not bona fide purchasers
for value."'
The principle that a fiduciary may not purchase for himself
property belonging to his trust estate or to his beneficiary applies
also, with some modifications, to execution, foreclosure, and judicial sales.J 40 Thus the administrator of an estate, foreclosing a
mortgage belonging to the estate, is not entitled to purchase the
mortgaged property for himself at the foreclosure sale.' 41 A mortgagee by deed absolute, who had taken conveyances of an embarrassed debtor's property as security for advances to be made
in paying off prior incumbrances, may not acquire the absolute
interest in such property by purchase from the subsequent as13,Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 177; in accord, Brown v. Fischer,
(1899) 77 Minn. 1, 79 N. W. 494.
IFor the trial court's finding, see note 128 above.
1'-fThe others being American Railway Express Co. v. Houle, (1926)
169 Minn. 209, 210 N. W. 889, 48 A. L. R. 1266, (discussed at pp. 683-687
above), and Donnelly v. Cunningham, (1894) 58 'Minn. 376, 59 N. W. 1052
(discussed at pp. 692-693 above).
140Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 192, comments b and c.
14'Baldwin v. Allison, (1860) 4 Minn. 25 (Gil. 11, 13).
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signee in bankruptcy of the mortgagor. 142 The same underlying
principle is behind the maxim "once a mortgage always a mortgage. ' " 3 A receiver purchasing property of his estate at an execution sale under a judgment against the debtor holds the same upon
44
constructive trust for the latter.1
A statute in this state specifically provides with respect to the
representative of a decedent's estate that he "shall not purchase
any claim against the estate, nor shall he purchase directly or indirectly or be interested in the purchase of any property sold by
him. 1 ' 4

In Cain v. McGeenty"48 the court affirmed a decree re-

fusing to set aside a sale of real estate belonging to an estate by
the administrator to his adult son, pointing out that the relation
between the administrator and the purchaser "was a circumstance
to be considered, with the others in the case, in determining the
question of actual fraud in the sale; but the law would not infer
fraud from it.' 1 4 ' On the other hand a sale by a mother, as

guardian of her infant children, of the property of their estate
to their step-father, was set aside, on the ground of indirect interest, in Brozor z. Fischer.4 8 Similarly, in In re Estate of
Sprain, 49 the court apparently regarded a sale of real estate belonging to an estate by the administrator to his wife as being one
in which he was "directly or indirectly" interested within the
meaning of the controlling statute, but held that the sale, having
been confirmed by an order of the probate court, could not be attacked on an appeal from an order refusing to vacate the order
of confirmation, but only, if at all, by a separate proceeding in
the district court in which all interested parties were joined."'
The Restatement takes the position that where the particular rela142King
v. Remington, (1886) 36 Minn. 15, 29 N. W. 352.
143By virtue of 2 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 9573, it is no longer the
law in this state as formerly that a conveyance by a mortgagor to his mortgagee of the equity of redemption will be presumed to be by way of further
security. See Roehrs v. Thompson, (1929) 179 Minn. 73, 76, 228 N. W. 340,
341: "The mortgagee may always purchase that right for a fair consideration if the transaction is untainted by any oppression or advantage taken of
the necessities or distress of the nortgagor." (Italics supplied.)
'44Donahue v. Quackenbush, (1895) 62 Minn. 132, 64 N. W. 141.
1453 Mason's Minn. Stat. (1940
Supp.) sec. 8992-90, superseding 2
Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 8847. Although the cases herein discussed
refer to the latter section, the principles they enunciate should remain valid
under the new statutory provision, the substance of which is the same.
146(1889) 41 Minn. 194, 42 N. W. 933.
'4'(1889)
41 Minn. 194, 195, 42 N. W. 933; in accord, see Restatement,
Restitution (1937), sec. 192, comment e.
148(1899) 77 Minn. 1, 79 N. W. 494.
149(1937) 199 Minn. 511, 272 N. W. 779.
150(1937) 199 Minn. 511, 518, 272 N. W. 779, 783.
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tion "is one over the administration of which a court has power
of supervision, the fiduciary can properly purchase property entrusted to him as fiduciary for sale if the court permits him to
do so." '5 The Minnesota law is probably in accord, although the

statute previously cited does not expressly admit of any such
modification. It would seem in any event that for the court's
order of approval to be conclusive, it must have been based upon
full disclosure of all pertinent facts and the consideration for the
15 2
sale must have been adequate.
In Barber v. Bowen,15 3 the fact that a sale by an administrator
to a third person, otherwise valid, was followed by a conveyance
of the property by the third person to the administrator's wife,
for the same consideration paid by the former, was not deemed
of itself to be a sufficiently material circumstance to justify setting aside the sale. But where property that has once become
subject to a constructive trust interest is conveyed to a bona fide
purchaser for value and subsequently reacquired by the former
trustee, the constructive trust revives.1 5 4 Barber v. Bowen also
illustrates another modification of the disability of a fiduciary
to purchase the property of his beneficiary at either private or
public sales-namely, that the disability does not apply with
respect to property outside the scope of the fiduciary relation or
survive the termination of the relation, unless the fiduciary makes
use of information or of a continuing dominance over the beneficiary acquired by virtue of his fiduciary character. 1'5 In that
case the third person who purchased property of the estate from
the administrator was the mother and guardian of the infant heirs
of the estate. She purchased property, appraised at $2,700, with
a valid claim of her own for $3,300 against the estate. In re'15 2 Restatement, Restitution (1937), sec. 192, comment g.
°See In re Estate of Fiske, (1940) 207 Minn. 44, 49, 291 N. W. 289,
291 (investment by trust company of trust funds in shares of corporate
affiliate upheld where approved by probate court in proceeding in which
infant beneficiary was represented by independent counsel). In cases which
appear to deny the right of a court to authorize a trustee's purchase from
himself the facts show unfair dealing or inadequate consideration. See Comment, (1931) 15 MINNEsorA LAw REVIEW 842. The opinion in In re Estate
of Sprain, (1937) 199 Minn. 511, 272 N. W. 779, indicates that the mere
fact of confirmation by the probate court may not of itself completely immunize the purchase from attack in the district court.
153(1891)
47 Minn. 118, 49 N. W. 684.
1 54
Restatement, Restitution (1937), sec. 176 (1) ; Restatement, Trusts
(1935), secs. 170, comment e, and 317; Independent Coal and Coke Co. v.
United States, (1927) 274 U. S. 640, 648, 47 Sup. Ct. 714, 717, 71 L. Ed.
1270; see Arnold v. Smith, (1913) 121 Minn. 116, 132, 140 N. W. 748.
25 r'Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 191, comment f, sec. 192, comment f; Restatement, Trusts (1935) sec. 170, comment g.
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fusing to set aside the sale, the court pointed out that the appellants had "confounded two distinct estates, that of the deceased
intestate and that of his minor sons, and the representatives of
each, one being the administrator, the other a guardian," and that
the latter was entirely powerless "to interfere with or control
the property, which was to be sold in pursuance of the order of
the court, and not in the execution of any trust which she had
assumed."'5 6 It continued:
"Itis only when power and duty, the constituent elements of
a trust, towards a specific subject-matter, are conferred, that
fiduciary character and responsibility begins [sic]; and the relation which disables and prohibits must be one in which knowledge, by reason of the confidence reposed, might be acquired, or
power exists, to affect injuriously the interests of the beneficiary
or advance that of the trustee. But the rule referred to is not
pertinent or applicable to a case like this, where a sale is made
by an administrator, or any other public officer, under proceedings adverse to the interest of the cestui que trust, and the trustee
has not the means in his power to prevent the sale. .

.

. The

purchaser owed no duty to her wards in respect to the real property at the time she bought. It was no part of the trust estate
which had come into her possession or within her control, and,
for obvious reasons, it never would."' 157
But in Arnold v. Smith,15 8 the acquisition of property of an
estate by its former administrator was set aside under circumstances showing that it was the culmination of a series of acts,
begun while administrator, having the deliberate intent to acquire
the property for himself. And in Ashton v. Thompson," 9 where
the court set aside a conveyance, that amounted practically to a
donation, from a daughter to her mother made after the daughter
had attained her majority and the relation of guardian had tarminated but she nevertheless continued to reside with her mother,
it pointed out that
"Substantially the same rules [as are applicable to the relation of guardian and ward] are applied to the case of an ex
guardian, where, notwithstanding the termination of the formal
fiduciary relation between him and his ward, he still retains his
dominion in fact and his position of influence as respects the ward
or his property."' 60
A fiduciary's disability as a purchaser is by no means re150(1891)
157(1891)
158(1913)
15 (1884)
160(1884)

47 Minn. 118, 122, 49 N. W. 684, 685.
47 Minn. 118, 123, 49 N. W. 684, 685.
121 Minn. 116, 140 N. W. 748.
32 Minn. 25, 18 N. W. 918.
32 Minn. 25, 42, 18 N. W. 918, 922.

MINNESOTA LAW OF CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS

stricted, however, to property already owned by the fiduciary
in trust for, or by, the beneficiary. Other property, or particular
transactions concerning it, may be within the scope of and subject to the fiduciary relation. Thus a fiduciary is precluded from
acquiring for himself property which it is his duty to acquire for
the beneficiary, or which, if acquired for himself, will create a
conflict of interest between him and the beneficiary.' 6 ' In Turner v.
Frybcrger,1' 2 the attorney for the administrator of an estate had
purchased the life interest of the surviving husband in premises
whereof the reversion belonged to the estate. In its first decision
holding the administrator chargeable in his final account with the
profits realized from a resale of the life interest, the court stated:
"It was apparent that the property would sell more advantageously when the two interests were united than when sold
separately, as neither interest would command its real value if
offered for sale separately. It therefore became incumbent upon
the administrator to use all reasonable means to unite with the
owner of the life estate in disposing of the property. .

.

. No

party can be permitted to purchase an interest in property and
hold it for his own benefit where he has a duty to perform in
relation to such property which is inconsistent with the character of a purchaser on his own account and for his individual
use. .

.

. The attorney is simply the representative or the agent,

and the administrator the principal. It necessarily follows that,
if the administrator were himself prohibited from dealing in the
life estate for his own profit, so must his representative and attorney be likewise prohibited. The position is not changed by the
fact that the life estate was property not belonging to the estate,
but existed -as an independent right in the surviving husband, who
had the power of disposing of it to whomsoever he would. The
point is that there were conflicting interests between the two
estates. If the administrator was required to realize the greatest
amount which he reasonably could in the execution of his trust,
in so doing he necessarily would come in conflict with the owner
of the life estate, and his attorney could not represent the life
the
estate owned by himself, and at the same time, as attorney,
63
reversionary interest under control of the administrator.'
Without in any way impugning the principles so well stated
in the first opinion, the decision in the above case was reversed
upon reargument, and a new trial ordered, because of the trial
court's failure to have made any finding as to whether the cestui
261 Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 194.

As to disabilities of cor-

porate directors and officers in this respect, see Riley, Corporation's Right
to Profits Made by Directors, (1920)

4 MINNEsoTA LAw
162(1905) 94 Minn. 433, 103 N. W. 217.
103(1905) 94 Minn. 433, 436, 103 N. W. 217, 218.
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que trust had precluded himself from questioning the legality
of the purchase of the life estate by having consented thereto or
ratified the same. 64 In Rogers v. Gaston,1: 5 an attorney employed to foreclose a mortgage upon premises in which he found
the mortgagor to own only an undivided half-interest, and who
properly advised the mortgagee to bid in the property for only
half its value, as a result of which, however, the mortgage debt
was fully satisfied, was held not to have violated his fiduciary obligation by purchasing, more than two years after foreclosure,
the other undivided half-interest. The court added, however, the
following words of caution:
"But, since the information as to the title came out in the
course of his professional employment, it was undoubtedly his
duty to notify the plaintiff or his agent, and give him sufficient
time and opportunity to protect his interest by purchasing the
outstanding title, if he desired to do so. We cannot say that this
was not done in this case, or that ample time and opportunity
had not been given plaintiff to act in the premises. The courts,
however, will scrutinize such transactions closely, and an attorney
cannot well be too cautious and scrupulous in his conduct in making a purchase under such circumstances."' 6
It is also a general principle that a fiduciary may not acquire
the property of his beneficiary within the scope of the relation
by the purchase from a third person of a paramount title or outstanding incumbrance. 16 7 Where the relation is truly fiduciary in
respect of the property in question, the disability is not limited to
the situations in which it is the duty of the fiduciary to acquire
or discharge the outstanding title or incumbrance on behalf of
the beneficiary. 6 Where such a duty exists the disability is obvious, but even where it does not exist, the disability still results
from the necessity of avoiding a conflict of interests inconsistent
with the relation. The same disability may also result from a
strictly contractual as distinguished from a truly fiduciary duty
to protect another's title or discharge an incumbrance upon prop164 Turner v. Fryberger, (1906) 99 Minn. 236, 109 N. W. 229. The fact
that the life estate had been purchased by the fiduciary for $250 and resold
for $700 apparently was not regarded by the court as rendering the transaction so unreasonable or unfair as to preclude ratification by an adult
beneficiary.
165(1890) 43 Minn. 189, 45 N. W. 427.
166(1890) 43 Minn. 189, 191, 45 N. W. 427, 428.
167Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 196.
'68The intent of the law is that no conflict of interest shall arise. Restatement, Trusts (1935), sec. 170, comment j; 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees
(1935) sec. 485; 3 Scott, Trusts (1939) sec. 501; in accord, see Conkey v.
Dike, (1871) 17 Minn. 457 (Gil. 434).
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erty in which another has an interest. Thus a mortgagor in a
deed with covenants of warranty may not acquire a paramount
title as against his mortgagee, nor may he acquire by subrogation or otherwise, as against the mortgagee, a tax lien or other
incumbrance that it was his own duty to discharge. 1 9 On the
other hand, where neither a fiduciary relation nor a contractual
duty existed, it was properly held in Wilson v. Jamison'70 that
"the judgment creditor of the mortgagor, having by his judgment a lien upon the property junior to the mortgage, could, by
purchasing at tax sale, acquire, as against the mortgagee, a title
divesting the lien of the mortgage .... ,,17 Although the Minnesota court once stated that a mortgagee "stood in the relation of a trustee to .

.

the mortgagor, in respect to the

mortgaged premises, but with the statutory qualification that she
could have purchased the trust property at the sale,"'172 it would
seem that it meant nothing more than that a court of equity Nvill
carefully scrutinize dealings between them in respect of the
equity of redemption, and that there is nothing in the relation
as such, in the absence of special circumstances of trust and confidence,'17 3 to prevent the mortgagee from acquiring the mort-

gagor's remaining interest from a third person, or acquiring for
74
his own benefit an outstanding paramount title or incumbrance.
It is said to be the established doctrine "that a tenant for life
in possession, in the purchase of an incumbrance upon, or an
adverse title to, the estate, will be regarded as having made the
purchase for the joint benefit of himself and the reversioner or
remainder-man."' 17 Such a rule does not necessarily presuppose
169See MacEwen v. Beard, (1894) 58 Minn. 176, 59 N. W. 942.
170(1886) 36 Minn. 59, 29 N. W. 887, 1 Am. St. Rep. 635.
171(1886) 36 Minn. 59, 62, 29 N. W. 887, 888, 1 Am. St. Rep. 635. It
should be noted, however, that the appellate court, being evenly divided,
merely2 affirmed the lower court's decision without discussion of the problem.
Baldwin v. Allison, (1860) 4 Minn. 25 (Gil. 11, 14).
'7 3 In King v. Remington, (1886) 36 Minn. 15, 29, 29 N. W. 352, 360,
the court in finding such special circumstances described the relationship
of the parties as follows: "King placed himself wholly in the hands of
Remington, not only by conveying to him, by deeds absolute in terms, so
large an amount of property, which thus passed beyond his power to use
it in procuring money from anyone else for the purpose in view, but because the application of the advances in money and notes was left to the
judgment and discretion of the latter, and also because of the power given
to encumber
the property conveyed as security with mortgages."
174 Barteau v. Merriam, (1893) 52 Minn. 222, 53 N. \W. 1061; Fleming v.
McCutcheon, (1902) 85 Minn. 152, 88 N. W. 433 (mortgagee is not barred
from foreclosing his mortgage by becoming administrator of his mortgagor's
estate,5 provided he acts fairly and in good faith) ; see, also, note 143, above.
'7 Whitney v. Salter, (1886) 36 Minn. 103, 105, 30 N. W. 755, 1 Am.
St. Rep. 656; see, also, Kreuscher v. Roth, (1922) 152 Minn. 320, 188 N. W.
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either a fiduciary relation or an affirmative duty upon the life
tenant to protect the title of the entire estate against adverse
claims or incumbrances, but would seem to rest rather upon the
general negative duty of the life tenant while in possession to do
nothing to prejudice the interest of the remainderman or reversioner without the latter's consent. 76 In Minnesota there is said
to be "a fiduciary relation between cotenants,' 1 7 so that if one
cotenant redeems the premises from foreclosure sale, or acquires
a tax title, he is trustee of the other cotenant's share, with a
right of proportionate reimbursement secured by an equitable lien
upon the share thus held in trust.17 But the law governing the
liabilities of cotenants to each other is not in all respects consistent with the existence of a truly fiduciary relation between
them,17' and it has been suggested that the real ground of the
disability of one to acquire a tax title as against another is that
the obligation to pay the taxes rests equally upon each." s0 Consistently therewith, it has been held by some courts that the disability does not attach to a cotenant acquiring a tax title based
upon a default occurring prior to the time he acquired his interest.'"' In this state it apparently makes no difference when the
default occurred, or whether the interests of the cotenants are
derived

from separate instruments. 18 2 In Easton v. Scofield,"8

where the interests of cotenants had been separately assessed for
996; Faulkenburg v. Windorf, (1935) 194 Minn. 154, 160, 259 N. W. 802,
806.
176But compare Turner v. Edwards, (1940) 207 Minn. 455, 462, 292
N. W. 257, where the court rested its decision, holding that a third person
may not in collusion with a life tenant acquire the interests of remaindermen by purchase at tax sale for the life tenant's default in payment of
taxes, in part upon "the principle that parties cannot void a fiduciary disability by collusive arrangements with third persons." Stone and Peterson,
JJ., dissented from the court's refusal even to allow the purchaser a lien
for reimbursement as against the remainder interest, on the ground that a
part of the taxes in default had been due at the time the life tenant acquired her interest and therefore were properly chargeable against the
entire77estate.
' Slagle v. Slagle, (1932) 187 Minn. 1, 5, 244 N. W. 79, 80-81, noted
(1933) 8 17 MINNEsoTA LAw REvIEW 344.
17 Oliver v. Hedderly, (1884) 32 Minn. 455, 21 N. W. 478; Slagle v.
Slagle, (1932) 187 Minn. 1, 244 N. W. 79; see Holmes v. Campbell, (1865)
10 Minn. 401 (Gil. 320); cf. Holterhoff v. Mead, (1886) 36 Minn. 42,
29 N. W. 675; Comment, (1921) 5 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 134.
179Compare, for example, Kean v. Connelly, (1878) 25 Minn. 222, 224;
Murray v. Murray, (1924) 159 Minn. 111, 114, 198 N. W. 307, 308; Sons v.
Sons, (1922) 151 Minn. 360, 362, 186 N. W. 811, 812.
Is°Comment, (1917) 1 MINNESOTA LAW REvIEw 466.
"'3See Comment, (1922) 6 MINNESOTA LAw REvIEw 530.
"S'Hoyt v. Lightbody, (1906) 98 Minn. 189, 108 N. W. 843.
183(1896) 66 Minn. 425, 69 N. W. 326.
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tax purposes, Mr. Justice Mitchell, in a concurring opinion, contended that "when the purchasing cotenant is himself free from
any default in the payment of his own taxes," there is no "good
reason why he may not bid in at tax sale the interests of his
cotenants for his own use, there being in such case nothing in
the relations of the parties imposing any obligation on any tenant
in common to pay the taxes upon the moieties of the others."' "
But his position has been expressly disapproved,""5 and the consequences of an assumed fiduciary basis of this particular disability of a cotenant consistently applied by the Minnesota court.
The mortgagee of a cotenant's interest, however, does not share
his mortgagor's relation to the other cotenant, so that there is
nothing to prevent him from acquiring for his own exclusive
benefit an outstanding prior lien upon the entire estate. 88
It follows finally from the character of fiduciary relations
that the beneficiary is entitled to any bonus or commission improperly received by the fiduciary from another,1 7 to any profits
secretly retained by the fiduciary, 8 and to any profits or property acquired by the fiduciary through improper competition with
the beneficiary, 185 through the use of the latter's facilities1 90 or
through the use of confidential information received in the course
of the fiduciary relation.' 5 ' In all these respects the Minnesota
cases seem to be entirely in accord with the propositions of the
Restatement. "It is elementary, and a rule of universal application, that all profits and benefits accruing from the act of an
agent, whether resulting from the performance or violation of
his duty, belong to the principal, and not to the agent."' 92 An
assignee for the benefit of creditors, who buys up claims against
the assignor, is not entitled to enforce them for more than the
amount he paid."" In Gilbert v. Hewetson19 4 the confidential
184(1896) 66 Minn. 425, 431, 69 N. W. 326, 329.

'85
See Hoyt v. Lightbody, (1906) 98 Minn. 189, 192, 108 N. W. 843.
18 OBarteau v. Merriam, (1893) 52 Minn. 222, 53 N. W. 1061.
'187Restatement, Restitution (1937), sec. 197; Restatement, Trusts
(1935), sec. 170, comment n; see Risvold v. Gustafson, (Minn. 1941) 296

N. W.
88 411.

28 Restatement, Restitution (1937), sec. 197.

' sRestatement, Restitution (1937), sec. 199; Restatement, Trusts
(1935), sec. 170, comment o.
'1ORestatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 198; 3 Scott, Trusts (1939),
sec. 503.
5
9'Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 200.
192 Schick v. Suttle, (1905) 94 Minn. 135, 136-137, 102 N. W. 217.
103Restaternent, Restitution (1937), sec. 196, comment d; in accord,
Clark v. Stanton, (1877) 24 Minn. 232.
194(1900) 79 Minn. 326, 82 N. W. 655, 79 Am. St. Rep. 486.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

clerk of a receiver entered into ah arrangement with some attorneys to take assignments of claims against the estate in receivership, to use in garnishing a party against whom the estate had a
doubtful claim, for the purpose of forcing a settlement. The
plan having succeeded, the clerk was held accountable to the
estate for his share of the proceeds of the settlement, with an
equitable lien imposed upon the land in which he had invested
such proceeds. It was held to be entirely immaterial that the
claim of the estate upon which settlement was thus forced may have
been invalid, so that the estate was in fact deprived of no genuine
asset. In Chicago Flexotile Floar Co. v. Law,195 the defendant,
a vice president and director of the plaintiff corporation, after
negotiating two contracts on its behalf had, instead of transmitting them to it, resigned his offices and, by representing to the
other parties that the plaintiff had become unable to perform
such contracts, induced a transfer of them to another corporation with which he had become associated. He was held liable
for all profits derived by him from such contracts, and also for
the amount of secret commissions received by him from the other
company upon sales of materials by it to the plaintiff.196 In
Goodhue Farmers Warehouse Co. v. Davis,197 the defendant, a
salaried agent of the plaintiff cooperative association, was held
accountable to it for the profits derived by him from the use of
its warehouse, name, and credit in dealings in grain on his own
account. There is a much more extensive protection of the economic interest in mere ideas in the field of fiduciary relations than
elsewhere.' 98
There are situations in which the beneficiary's right to secret
profits of the fiduciary may be defeated by a third person's right
to rescind the transaction from whence the profits were derived.
Thus where an agent represents both buyer and seller without
disclosure to either of his representation of the other, either may
wholly rescind the transaction and the one who paid the agent's
commission or secret profits has a paramount right to their re195(1933) 188 Minn. 422, 247 N. W. 517.
196 See Riley, Corporation's Right to Profits Made by Directors, (1921)
4 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 513.
197(1900) 81 Minn. 210, 83 N. W. 531.
' 98See Note, (1930) 14 MINNEsoTA LAw RE IEw 537, 539: "Although
the courts speak of a property right in a trade secret or secret process
which equity will protect against one who acquires knowledge of it in violation of contract or confidence, it is the breach of trust, confidence, or contract which is the true ground of the interference of the equity court."
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turn."" In Liz v. McEwen,2 the plaintiff sued to cancel a note
for $5,000 which he had given to induce McEwen, as superintendent and general manager of a mill company, to use his influence
to have the company remove its mill to Brainerd. The mill
was in fact so removed. Cancellation was decreed on the ground
that the consideration was illegal, regardless of the fact "that no
actual injury to the company resulted, or that the policy recommended may have been for its best interest." '01 In view of the
guilty connection of the plaintiff with the transaction the court
expressed doubt as to whether he was entitled to affirmative relief,
but the defendant did not raise the point and the court adverted
to it only "in order that this case may not be considered an
authority on the point. ''22- The mill company was not made a
party to the suit. Had the consideration been in cash, or had the
note been paid to or transferred by MNIcEwen to a holder in due
course, it would seem clear that the plaintiff would not have been
entitled to rescission and that the mill company would have been
entitled to recover the proceeds of payment to or transfer by McEwen. Does the fact that the bribe was still in the form of an
executory obligation make a difference? It was obviously unenforceable by the agent. It would seem clear that a principal
should not be entitled to enforce for his own benefit an executory
obligation, unenforceable by the agent, which would be equally
unenforceable if made directly to the principal, as might have been
the case had the note been given by the town of Brainerd instead
of by a private individual. But the note of the plaintiff would
have been perfectly valid and enforceable had it been given directly
to the mill company in consideration of its removing to Brainerd.
The theory of the Restatement seems to be that the principal is
entitled to adopt or ratify such a transaction with the agent as
having been made for the principal's benefit.2 0 3 But the principal's

constructive trust interest in the note would seem to precede its
affirmative act of adoption or ratification, which is sufficiently
evidenced by the mere bringing of suit. It is therefore submitted
that the court should have regarded the mill company as the equit299Crump v. Ingersoll, (1890) 44 Minn. 84, 46 N. W. 141, same case
(1891) 47 Minn. 179, 49 N. W. 739.
200 (1894) 56 Minn. 278, 57 N. W. 662.
20
Lum v. McEwen, (1894) 56 Minn. 278, 282, 57 N. W. 662, 663.
202
Lum v. McEwen, (1894) 56 Minn. 278, 283, 57 N. W. 662, 663.
-03Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 197, comment a; Restatement,
Agency (1933) sec. 388, comment a.
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able owner of the note, and dismissed the suit for cancellation for
nonjoinder of an indispensable party defendant.
B. FRAUD, DURESS, UNDUE INFLUENCE, AND MISTAKE.Violations of fiduciary relations are frequently referred to by the
courts as forms of "constructive fraud" or legally inferred undue
influence, 20 4 which means merely that the same results follow
although in fact there may have been none of the basic elements
of real fraud or undue influence present. Of course, in the lesser
degrees of fiduciary relations, and in determining whether a beneficiary has validly consented to or ratified a transaction in which
his fiduciary is adversely interested, the significance of such
factors as the extent of disclosure of pertinent facts, the presence
or absence of actual influence upon the beneficiary by the
fiduciary, and the fairness and reasonableness of the transaction,
causes the law of fiduciary relations to shade imperceptibly into
the law of actual fraud and undue influence. Furthermore, undue
influence is seldom dissociated from a close personal relationship
of some sort, which in turn, although not strictly fiduciary, renders
actual fraud so much the easier to establish.2 0 5 Consequently the
break between the subject-matter of the preceding section and
that of the present is gradual rather than sharp, with an overlapping middle ground.
The Minnesota court has expressed its full approval of the
rule of the Restatement that "where the owner of property transfers it, being induced by fraud, duress or undue influence of the
transferee, the transferee holds the property upon a constructive
trust for the transferor."20 6 We are not here dealing with the
elements in point of substance of fraud, duress, undue influence,
or mistake, but rather with their consequences on the assumption
that they have been found to be present. Particularly in cases of
mistake alone, the right to restitution from a transferee who has
given value or is otherwise a party to a bargain transaction, even
though not a bona fide purchaser for value, is usually of a much
20
See Ashton v. Thompson, (1884) 32 Minn. 25, 41-42, 18 N. W. 918,
922: "In such cases the undue influence is, on grounds of public policy, prima
facie 20presumed from the peculiar relations subsisting between the parties."
5Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 8 (3, a) ; Adan v. Steinbrecher,
(1911) 116 Minn. 174, 133 N. W. 477; Voss v. Scott, (1930) 180 Minn. 88,
230 N. W. 262; Hassman v. First State Bank of Swatara, (1931) 183 Minn.
453, 236 N. W. 921; Scheele v. Union Loan & Finance Co., (1937) 200
Minn.
20 554, 561-562, 274 N. W. 673, 677.
ORestatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 166, quoted with approval in
Penn Anthracite Mining Co. v. Clarkson Securities Co., (1939) 205 Minn.
517, 522, 287 N. W. 15, 18.
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more restricted character than the right to restitution from a donee
or one occupying substantially the position of a donee.20 7 The
nature of the transaction may likewise determine the question of
who, as between a transferor or transferee on the one hand and
a third person on the other, is the one entitled to enforce a constructive trust.
If a transfer of title to property is effected by virtue of a mistake of the parties of such a nature as to entitle the transferor to
restitutionary relief, the transferee may be held as constructive
trustee of the property so transferred. 20 8 Conversely, if such
a transfer is ineffective because of mistake, or conveys less or
different property than intended by both parties, the would-be
transferee, unless a donee, will normally have a right of reformation equivalent to a constructive trust interest in the property
intended to be conveyed. 20 9 Where in the course of a gratuitous
transfer the donor by mistake fails effectively to convey the property, he holds it in most cases free of trust for the reason that
he has not been unjustly enriched. 21 0 If on the other hand the
2
07The Restatement takes the position, for example, that rescission for
unilateral mistake, with its concomitant constructive trust interest where
property has been transferred as a consequence of such mistake, can be
had only as against a donee or one who knows or suspects the existence

of the mistake. Restatement, Restitution (1937), secs. 12 and 163, comment b. But the Minnesota court has been much more liberal in allowing
relief for unilateral mistake. St. Nicholas Church v. Kropp, (1916) 135
Minn. 115, 160 N. W. 500, L. R. A. 1917D 741; Olson v. Shephard, (1926)
165 Minn. 433, 436-437, 206 N. W. 711, 712-713; Hatcher v. Union Trust
Co. of Maryland, (1928) 174 Minn. 241, 246, 219 N. W. 76, 78. But a
transaction need not have been one of intended gift in order to bring the one
profiting by a unilateral mistake within the rules allowing more extensive
relief as against those in the position of donees. See Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 49, comment a ("as where a person surrenders a lien against
property believing that he is the owner thereof, or surrenders a claim believing that it has been satisfied;") in accord, Benson v. Markoe, (1887)

37 Minn. 30, 38, 33 N. W. 38, 42; Gerdine v. Menage, (1889) 41 Minn. 417,
43 N.2 W. 931; Hirleman v. Nichols, (1934) 193 Minn. 51, 258 N. W. 13.
0sRestatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 163. Compare the cases granting reformation to the grantor under similar circumstances, with the same
effect as that of a constructive trust. Christman v. Colbert, (1885) 33 Minn.
509, 24 N. W. 301; Crookston v. Marshall (1894) 57 Minn. 333, 59 N. W.
294; 20Goode v. Riley, (1891) 153 Mass. 585, 28 N. E. 228.
O1n this state a deed or contract to convey real estate may be reformed
"as well by including in it the description of a subject-matter omitted as by
excluding from it a subject already in it." Olson v. Erickson, (1890) 42
Minn. 440, 443, 44 N. W. 317, 318, where the court referred to but expressly

rejected the view of Glass v. Hulbert, (1869) 102 Mass. 24, 3 Am. Rep. 418,
that reformation is precluded in such a case by the statute of frauds.

Com-

pare 2Restatement, Contracts (1932) sec. 509.
1ORestatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 164, comment a. Seemingly in
accord in principle, see Leach v. Leach, (1925) 162 Minn. 159, 202 N. W.
448, noted (1925) 9 MINNESOTA LAW RvExlxv 482. Under the rule of the
Restatement change of position on the donee's part may entitle him to the
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donor effectively makes a conveyance, but to a different person than
the one intended, the transferee will be held as constructive trustee
for the donor, unless the intended transferee has given value or
is a natural object of the bounty of a donor since deceased, in
.which cases the intended transferee may be held to be the beneficiary
of the trust.2 1
Thus in MacDonald v. Kneeland,212 where a
debtor without notice of an assignment paid the assignor, it was
said that "the latter will be held to have received the same as
trustee for the assignee."
Although a transferee who acquires title to property through
the fraud, duress, or undue influence of himself 213 or a third
party, 214 or through a mistake of the type justifying restitutionary
property, and the doctrine whereby certain parol gifts of land are removed
from the statute of frauds seems to rest in this state upon a somewhat
analogous principle. See Trebesch v. Trebesch, (1915) 130 Minn. 368, 153
N. W. 754; Atwood v. Frye, (1937) 199 Minn. 596, 273 N. W. 85. The
Restatement and some cases likewise favor the donee where he is a natural
object of the donor's bounty and the latter has died believing he has made
an effective conveyance. M'Call v. M'Call, (1809) 3 Day (Conn.) 402;
Mason v. Moulden, (1877) 58 Ind. 1; contra in result, Miller v. Beardslee,
(1913) 175 Mich. 414, 141 N. W. 566. See, also, Comment, (1930) 14
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 425, indicating that probably the weight of
authority favors the view that since equity will not aid a volunteer it will
not aid
the intended donee even under such circumstances.
211
Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 165; see Johnson v. Carpenter,
(1862) 7 Minn. 176 (Gil. 120): "If the mortgagor pays the mortgage to
the mortgagee after it has been ,assigned, without notice of the assignment,
the lien is extinguished and the land cleared of the encumbrance, and the
mortgagee becomes a trustee of the sum paid for the benefit of the owners
of the debt;" Winona & St. Peter R. R. v. St. Paul & Sioux City R. R.,
(1879) 26 Minn. 179, 182, 2 N. W. 489, 491; Kolars v. Brown, (1909)
108 Minn. 60, 121 N. W. 229.
212(1861) 5 Minn. 352 (Gil. 283).
2
13Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 166. For cases of fraudulent
conduct by the transferee entitling the transferor to equitable relief, see
Kiefer v. Rogers, (1872) 19 Minn. 32 (Gil. 14); Hegenmeyer v. Marks,
(1887) 37 Minn. 6, 32 N. W. 785, 5 Am. St. Rep. 808; Gaetke v. The Ebarr
Co., Inc., (1935) 195 Minn. 393, 263 N. W. 448. For illustrative cases of
duress and undue influence, see Ashton v. Thompson, (1884) 32 Minn. 25,
18 N. W. 918; Graham v. Burch, (1890) 44 Minn. 33, 46 N. W. 148;
Claggett v. Claggett, (1939) 204 Minn. 568, 284 N. W. 363. Compare
Allen v. Allen, (1939) 204 Minn. 395, 397, 283 N. W. 558, 559, where in
an action for specific restitution for breach by the transferee of a contract
to care for the transferor, the court in granting relief stated: "Contracts
to care for and support another are regarded differently from ordinary commercial agreements. . . . Family discord and disruptions, such as we have
here, render performance impractical if not impossible. Equitable powers
must of necessity be resorted to in order to remedy the situation resulting
from breach. Restoration of the property to the grantor generally has
been approved as the proper form of relief."
214
Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 167; in accord, Graham v.
Burch, (1890) 44 Minn. 33, 36, 41 N. W. 148 (holding that where fraud
or undue influence has been established "it should be deemed to avoid the
conveyance, not merely to the grantee who procured it by such means, but
also in the absence of valuable consideration paid, as to the innocent
grantees not chargeable with such fault") ; Claggett v. Claggett, (1939) 204
Minn. 568, 572, 284 N. W. 363.
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relief, is deemed to hold the property upon a constructive trust
for the benefit of the transferor, there of course will normally
exist in the transferee a power to pass a valid title to a bona fide
purchaser for value.2 15 Upon such a further transfer the consideration received by the wrongdoer is substituted as the res upon
which the constructive trust is imposed. 216 In Penn Anthracite
Mining Co., v. Clarkson Securities Co., 21 7 the Minnesota court

properly held, however, that the transferee of the wrongdoer, taking with notice of the wrong, is as much subject to the constructive
trust as the wrongdoer himself. So likewise, in Tapley v.
Tapley,218 a wife's deed executed under the duress of her husband
was set aside as against a transferee who was not a bona fide
purchaser for value.
The constructive trust interest of a third person may result
from the commission of a wrong by either the transferor or the
transferee in the making or procuring of the transfer. Thus
where a debtor conveys property in fraud of his creditors, a
transferee not a bona fide purchaser for value holds it subject
to their claims.21 9 In Farwellv. St. Paul Trust Co., 220 the creditor
215
The statement of Mitchell, J., in Third Nat'l Bank of St. Paul v.
Stillwater Gas Co., (1886) 36 Minn. 75, 78, 30 N. W. 440, that "It is ele-

mentary that'a person obtaining property by fraud acquires no title to it, but
it is held by him and all persons claiming under him with notice in trust for
the original owner," is incorrect if literally construed. For if the fraud is of
such a nature that it goes to the execution rather than the inducement of the
transaction so that legal title does not pass, the transferee has nothing upon
which to impose a constructive trust and nothing to transfer even to a bona
fide purchaser for value in the absence of the elements of estoppel operating
against the original would-be transferor. Restatement, Restitution (1937)
sec. 160, comment j, sec. 166, comment f; Restatement, Contracts (1932)
sec. 475; in accord, Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Anderson, (1934) 191 Minn.
275, 21
253 N. W. 885.
GRestatement, Restitution (1937) secs. 166, comment f, and 202; Third
Nat'l Bank of St. Paul v. Stillwater Gas Co., (1886) 36 Minn. 75, 30
N. W. 440.
217(1939) 205 Minn. 517, 287 N. W. 15.
218(1865) 10 Minn. 448 (Gil. 360).
220
Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 168 (2), comment c. Minnesota
has adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act. 2 Mason's 1927
Minn. Stat., secs. 8475-8489; see Lind v. 0. N. Johnson Co., (1938) 204
Minn. 30, 282 N. W. 661; Bridgman, The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances
Act, (1923) 7 MINNEsoTA LAW PRviEW 530; Note, (1939) 23 MINNESOTA
LAW REviEw 616. Certain common law and statutory "badges of fraud" play
an important role in the Minnesota law of fraudulent conveyances. See
Note, (1940) 24 MINNFSOTA LAW REvImw 832. In Doland v. Burns Lumber Co., (1923) 156 Minn. 238, 240, 194 N. W. 636, 637, it is said that
property fraudulently conveyed "may be levied upon and sold the same as if
the conveyance had not been made." See, also, Comment, Effect of Renunciation by a Donee as a Fraud Upon His Creditors, (1930) 14 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 570.
220(1891) 45 Minn. 495, 48 N. W. 326, 22 Am. St. Rep. 742.
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of an individual partner, who with knowledge accepted payment
of his claim from partnership funds, was not permitted to retain
the amount received. Where it is the transferee who by fraud,
duress, or undue influence procures a transfer causing harm to a
third person, the latter is entitled to be placed in the position he
would have been in but for the wrongful conduct of the transferee.2 21

Thus, in Rollins v. MV1itchell,= 2 where the plaintiff, a

stranger to the title, had secured a conveyance of real estate from
the defendant's grantor by leading her to believe that it was in
support of her original defective deed to the defendant, the court
treated the plaintiff as constructive trustee for the benefit of the
defendant and expressly stated that it was unnecessary that the
plaintiff have occupied a fiduciary relation toward the defendant
or that the latter should have had an antecedent claim to the land
that could have been enforced as against the grantor. For as the
court said,

2 2-

"The rights of the third person in such cases depend not upon
the fact that he had some legal or equitable claim to the property
before the constructive trust was created, but upon the fact that
party for whose
he acquired such right by the trust, as being ' the
'224
benefit it was intended by the former owner.

The mere breach by the transferee, however, of a contract or
promise to convey the property to the third person or to hold it in
trust for his benefit, is not the type of wrong that will result in the
imposition of a constructive trust in his favor, 225 unless the trans-

fer was procured in such manner by a transferee occupying a
confidential relation to the transferor, 226 or was made by the
22
'Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 169.
222(1892)
52 Minn. 41, 53 N. W. 1020.
22

3Rollins v. Mitchell, (1892) 52 Minn. 41, 49, 53 N. W. 1020, 1022.
The correct basis of the decision in Rollins v. Mitchell was overlooked by the Minnesota court in the later case of Wunder v. Wunder,
(1932) 187 Minn. 108, 114, 244 N. W. 682, 685, where, in a decision not inconsistent on the facts, Rollins v. Mitchell was unnecessarily distinguished
on the ground that "Mitchell had once bought and paid for the land in controversy, so the holder of the fraudulently obtained deed was adjudged a
trustee
22 of the title for his benefit."
5Towlerton v. Davidson, (1862) 7 Minn. 408 (Gil. 322) ; Connelly v.
Sheridan, (1889) 41 Minn. 18, 42 N. W. 595. The same is true of the mere
breach of a contract to reconvey the property to or hold it in trust for the
transferor. Tatge v. Tatge, (1885) 34 Minn. 272, 25 N. W. 596, 26 N. W.
121; Pillsbury-Washburn Flour-Mills Co. v. Kistler, (1893) 53 Minn. 123,
54 N.
22 W. 1063.
GRestatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 183 (b). But the Minnesota
court has indicated the view that the grantor rather than the third person
will be the beneficiary of the constructive trust in such a situation. See
Haruey v. Harey, (1927) 170 Minn. 479, 480-481, 213 N. W. 38, 39,
noted (1927) 12 MINNEsOTA LAw REVIEW 88. A transferee occupying a
fiduciary or confidential relation with the transferor will likewise be held as
224
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transferor in contemplation of death.2

27

The contemplation of

death exception includes cases of transfers, procured by such
a promise of the transferee, which take effect subsequently by will
28
or intestacy.
The so-called "occupying claimants law" in this state provides
that one who "under color of title in fee and in good faith, has
peaceably taken possession of land for which he has given a
valuable consideration, or . . under the official deed of any person
or officer empowered by law or by any court of competent jurisdiction to sell land," shall not be ejected therefrom "until compensation is tendered him .. .for such improvement which he or they

have made upon such land previous to actual notice of the claim
upon which the action is founded, or, in case of possession under
an official deed, previous to actual notice of defects invalidating
the same."220 The Restatement has adopted a similar principle
to the effect that where one, through a reasonable mistake, puts
improvements upon the land of another,
"The owner is entitled to obtain judgment in an equitable proceeding or in an action of trespass or other action for the mesne
profits only on condition that he makes restitution to the extent
that the land has been increased in value by such improvements,
or for the value of the labor and materials employed in making
such improvements, whichever is least."230
A person who by mistake alone, however, makes improvements
upon the land of another, has no affirmative right either to recover a
personal judgment or to impose an equitable lien. 23
But if he
is induced to do so by the fraud, duress, or undue influence of the
owner, he "is entitled to recover the value of his services or
constructive trustee for a transferor who was himself the beneficiary of the
intended oral trust. Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 182 (b); in
accord,
227 Henderson v. Murray, (1909) 108 Minn. 76, 79, 121 N. W. 214, 216.
Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 183 (c).
Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 186; in accord, Barrett v.

22 8

Thielen, (1918) 140 Minn. 266, 270, 167 N. W. 1030, 1032, 168 N. W. 126;

Ives v. Pillsbury, (1938) 204 Minn. 142, 146, 283 N. W. 140, 142 (citing this
section of the Restatement with approval but finding insufficient evidence of

an agreement). Although no Minnesota cases in point have been found, it
would seem that the same principle is applicable to like transfers through
the payment of the proceeds of insurance policies.
22D2 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., see. 9565. Compare the liberal construction put upon the mechanics' lien statute, 2 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec.
8490, in Lamoreaux v. Anderson, (1915) 128 Minn. 261, 267, 150 N. W. 908;
and see Burner v. Northwestern Bible and M. T. School, (1925)
480, 23
485, 201 N. V. 939.

161 Minn.

ORestatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 42 (1) ; cf. Mehl v. Norton,
(1937)
23 1 201 Minn. 203, 275 N. W. 843.

Unless the mistake was caused by or known to the other. Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 40 (a) (c). Cf. Stanton v. Morris Const. Co.,
(1924) 159 Minn. 380, 199 N. W. 104.
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expenditures . . . and has an equitable lien upon the property
for the amount of his claim. ' 23 2 A somewhat different approach

to the problem was made by the Minnesota court in Karpik v.
Robinson, 23 where, in an action for the conversion of a log house,

the evidence showed that the plaintiff, by a mistake as to boundary
shared and probably caused by the defendant's vendee in possession, had built the house on the defendant's side of the true
boundary line between their respective properties. The court,
speaking through Stone, J., worked out an implied agreement
between the parties that the structure should remain the personal
property of the one erecting it, so as to prevent the defendant
from being unjustly enriched. The decision is in accord with
justice and recognized equitable principles, 234 but to found the
plaintiff's right on an implied agreement, between two parties
both of whom are acting under a mistaken apprehension as to an
essential fact, seems entirely fictitious.

35

C. APPLICATION OF THE FOREGOING PRINCIPLES TO INTERESTS IN LAND.-Where a proper basis for the imposition of a

constructive trust or an equitable lien exists, in facts falling within
the previously stated principles, it makes no difference that the
property upon which the trust or lien is sought to be imposed is
an interest in land, or homestead property, or property which
otherwise, if beneficially owned by the titleholder, would be
exempt from the claims of his creditors.2 3 6

The trust or lien

being imposed by operation of law, neither the statute of frauds,
the statute of uses and trusts, nor the parol evidence rule have
anything to do with the matter. The statute of frauds does not
232
Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 170, comment b.
2 (1927) 171 Minn. 318, 214 N. W. 59.
23

4See McClintock, Equity (1936) 216; Comment, (1930) 14 MINNELAW REviEw 565. Although the court in Karpik v. Robinson did not
discuss the measure of damages, its language indicates that recovery was had
on the basis of the value of the house treated as having remained personalty.
The Minnesota court in granting restitution for improvements made by a
purchaser under a land sale contract that the seller has refused to perform
apparently has limited the measure of recovery to the enhanced value of the
land, or the cost of the improvements, whichever is less. Lancoure v.
Dupre, (1893) 53 Minn. 301, 307, 55 N. W. 129, 130; Schultz v. Thompson,
(1923) 156 Minn. 357, 360, 194 N. W. 884, 885; Lepak v. Lepak, (1935)
195 235
Minn. 24, 25, 261 N. W. 484.
Mr. Justice Stone has stated in another connection that "Fiction
has its useful place elsewhere, but not on the bench." In re Trust Under
Will of Clark, '(1939) 204 Minn. 574, 578, 284 N. W. 876.
238
6Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 202, comments h and k; in
accord, Shearer v. Barnes, (1912) 118 Minn. 179, 197, 136 N. W. 861, 868:
"The very claim of a homestead in the property is a breach of the trust
which arose out of the manner of its acquisition.!
SOTA

MINNESOTA LAW OF CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS

preclude restitution in favor of one performing an oral contract
37
which the other party thereto refuses to perform on his part ;2
and it likewise does not preclude the imposition of a constructive
trust upon the subject-matter of the performance rendered under
such circumstances, although an interest in land.2 38 One who
refrains from protecting an interest in land from involuntary sale,
in reliance on the prior promise of the purchaser to hold it for or
reconvey it to the owner, is entitled to hold the purchaser as constructive trustee if he fails to fulfill his promise.23 9 A misunderstanding of the correct basis of this principle led to an
incorrect result in the early Minnesota case of Williams v.
Stewart.240 There the court assumed that a mortgagor's reliance
on the foreclosure purchaser's oral promise to reconvey to the
mortgagor constituted such a "part performance" as would take
the promise out of the statute of frauds, but held that the terms
of the oral agreement, as to the time of repayment of the purchase
price by the mortgagor, were too indefinite to permit of enforcement of the purchaser's promise. The theory of the rule as stated,
however, is not that the contract is being enforced, but rather
that because of its very failure a constructive trust is imposed for the
benefit of one who has relinquished antecedent rights in the
property in reliance on the promise and its anticipated fulfillment . 41 The sufficiency of the agreement, in connection with
which such promise was made,-to constitute a contract apart from
the effect of the statute of frauds should therefore have been entirely immaterial.
The Minnesota court has also been somewhat influenced in its
attitude toward constructive trust interests in land by the express
statutory abolition of oral trusts in land, including purchasemoney resulting trusts..2 42 Thus the court in Connelly v. Sheri-217Todd v. Bettingen, (1910) 109 Minn. 493, 124 N. W. 443; Spinney
v. Hill, (1900) 81 Minn. 316, 84 N. W. 116; Lally v. Crookston Lumber
Co., (1902) 85 Minn. 257, 88 N. W. 846; Oxborough v. St. Martin, (1926)
169 Minn. 72, 210 N. W. 854; see, also, Comment, (1932) 16 MINN-soTA
LAw REvmw 875.
22

3 Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 180.

22

3 Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 181; in accord, Janochosky v.
Kurr, (1913) 120 Minn. 471, 139 N. W. 944.
210(1879) 25 Minn. 516.
41
2 As to necessity of reliance, see Jacoby v. Crowe, (1886) 36 Minn.
93, 30 N. W. 441 (constructive trust held precluded because bona fide purchaser for value had intervened and also because there was no finding "that
but for this understanding or agreement Crowe would have redeemed, or
that he refrained from redeeming in reliance thereon").
2422 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., secs. 8086-8088, 8459.
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dan2 43 purported to construe the Minnesota statutes of uses and

trusts "as abolishing all trusts in lands paid for by one person,
where the conveyance is to another absolutely, whether for the
benefit of the person paying the money, or for some other person,
excepting in cases where the conveyance is so taken without the
knowledge or consent of the person whose money has been so
used, or where the alienee, in violation of some trust, has purchased the land so conveyed with moneys belonging to another
person; and excepting, also, the trust in favor of creditors."' 24 '

Although the exceptions as stated by the court are true instances
of constructive trusts, they are by no means all-inclusive of the
proper situations for application of the constructive trust doctrine.
While the Minnesota court itself has applied the constructive trust
device to other situations,24 so that the language quoted above
should not be regarded as accurately stating the law of this state,
it has not yet recognized, in the case of agencies to buy real estate,
that a fiduciary relation, justifying the imposition of a constructive
trust upon an interest in land that the agent is to buy for his
principal but buys for himself instead, may result from the very
transaction

authorizing

or

directing

purchase.2

such
2

40

The

7

language of the court in Dougan v. Bemis, 1 to the effect that
"if the agent in such a case buys with his own money [instead of
with the principal's] . . .and the rights of the principal rest upon
a verbal agreement, which is denied, . . . the case will fall within

the statute of frauds," has now been repudiated in Whitten v.
Wright,241 where a constructive trust was imposed under circum-

stances similar except for the fact of a previously and independently existing fiduciary relation. The court distinguished Dougan
v. Benmis249 on the ground that in that case, "Apart from the oral
agreement, no relation of trust and confidence existed between
the parties," 2"0 but unfortunately failed to recognize that the
necessary fiduciary relationship may result from the very oral
251

agreement itself.
243(1889) 41 Minn. 18, 20, 42 N. W. 595.
244
See, also, Petzold v. Petzold, (1893) 53 Minn. 39, 54 N. W. 933.
245See, for example, Henderson v. Murray, (1909) 108 Minn. 76, 121
N. W. 214, note 226 above; Barrett v.Thielen, (1918) 140 Minn. 266, 167
N. W.
246 1030, 168 N. W. 126, note 228 above.
Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 194 (2).
247(1905) 95 Minn. 220, 223-224, 103 N. W. 882, 884.
248(1939) 206 Minn. 423, 429, 289 N. W. 508, 511.
249(1905) 95 Minn. 220, 103 N. W. 882.
250(1939) 206 Minn. 423, 429, 289 N. W. 508, 511.
25

'See Feezer, Constructive Trusts in Cases of Agency to Buy Real
17 'INNESOTA LAw R vrzw 734.

Estate, (1933)
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III.

NECESSITY OF TRACING THE ORIGINAL PROPERTY OR ITS
PROCEEDS

In the discussion so far it has been seen that where one wrongfully acquires the legal title to property of another, the latter or
in some instances a third person may, under specified circumstances, resort to the constructive trust or equitable lien devices
for aid in securing such property. But the beneficiary's interest
in the original property secured by these devices may be terminated in either of two ways :252 (1) As before mentioned, by its
transfer to a bona fide purchaser for value; and (2) By its dissipation in a manner to preclude the application of tracing principles. The latter event alone, however, entirely terminates the
constructive trust and equitable lien remedies. In most situations,
of course, the beneficiary will retain a cause of action in personam
against the wrongdoer; ' 3 but if the latter is financially irresponsible so that the beneficiary can be made whole, if at all, only by
being allowed to come in ahead of the general creditors, or if the
wrongdoer has realized a profit on his subsequent disposition of
the original property, it is to the beneficiary's interest to proceed
against the consideration received from such disposition. It is
with the availability of the constructive trust and equitable lien
remedies against the product of the original property-through
successive changes of ownership or transmutations of form-with
which we are now primarily concerned.25 4 The same as in the
case of the original property, when once the trust or lien attaches
to a specific product on the tracing principles here developed, it
remains so attached until such particular product reaches a bona
fide purchaser for value or itself is dissipated in a manner to
preclude further tracing.
Although the Minnesota court, in dealing with the problem
of following property into its product, has not expressly drawn
2 2
5 The right to enforce the interest may of course be terminated in other
ways, as by the expiration of the statutory period of limitations or the application of the equitable doctrine of laches. See Stillwater & St. Paul R. R.
Co. v. City of Stillwater, (1896) 66 Minn. 176, 178, 68 N. W. 836, 837;
Duxbury v. Boice, (1897) 70 Minn. 113, 119-120, 72 N. W. 838, 839-840.
2 3
5 For exceptions see note 11 above.
254Third Nat'l Bank of St. Paul v. Stillwater Gas Co., (1886) 36 Minn.
75, 78, 30 N. W. 440, 441: "So long as the property can be identified in its
original or in a substituted form, it belongs to the original owner, if he
elects to reclaim it; and, if it passes into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the title of the defrauded owner, at his option, at once
attaches to the avails, so long as their identity is preserved, no matter how
many transmutations of form the property has passed through."
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a distinction based on the conscious character of the wrong, or
recognized in this connection a distinction between knowledge
and notice of the beneficiary's interest,25 5 it has clearly recognized
that the beneficiary's right of election between the constructive
trust and equitable lien remedies extends as well to the product
in the wrongdoer's hands as to the originally misappropriated
property itself.2 5 6

Of course the granting of such relief to the

beneficiary places him in a better position than that of the general
creditors of the constructive trustee or equitable lienee. But
his advantageous position is not the result of a preference accorded him by the court. Instead, the beneficiary never was in
the same position as the general creditors. For, as previously
pointed out, 257 the trust or lien arises immediately upon the com-

mission of the wrong, thus leaving an equitable property interest
in the beneficiary. And the doctrine whereby such property subsequently disposed of may be followed into its product is based
generally "upon the theory that the product or avails of the
property have imparted to them the nature of the original property, and belong to the same party.

' 258

It is this specific property

interest that enables the beneficiary to come in ahead of the
general creditors. Through the constructive trust device he is
merely taking legal title to property of which he is already the
equitable owner.25 9 Hence to speak, as many courts have, of
according the beneficiary a preference, is clearly a misnomer,
unless they refer to a right that is not founded upon an equitable
property interest.
Although the courts are in agreement upon the general principles as stated above, they have differed considerably in their
determination of the question whether the property disposed of
has been sufficiently identified with its purported product to enable
the beneficiary to reach the latter. Thus there is today a well
recognized "majority doctrine" and an equally as well recognized
255
Compare
256

Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 202, comment a.
Shearer v. Barnes, (1912) 118 Minn. 179, 189, 136 N. W. 861, 864;
Cisewski
v. Cisewski, (1915) 129 Minn. 284, 286, 152 N. W. 642, 643.
25
See above, at pp. 677-678 of the text.
258
Twohy Mercantile Co. v. Melbye, (1899) 78 Minn. 357, 360, 81 N. W.
20, 21; see, also, Third Nat'l Bank of St. Paul v. Stillwater Gas Co., (1886)
36 Minn.
25 9 75, 30 N. W. 440.
Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 215, comment a; in accord,
Twohy Mercantile Co. v. Melbye, (1899) 78 Minn. 357, 360, 81 N. W. 20,
21: "This doctrine has its basis in the right of property, and not in any
theory of a preference to the owner of the property over creditors of the
tortfeasor;" see, also, Forsythe v. First State Bank of Mentor, (1932) 185
Minn. 255, 241 N. W. 66.
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"minority doctrine." 260 Most jurisdictions, including Minnesota,
profess to place upon the beneficiary the burden of proving the
identity between the property disposed of and that sought to be
reached in its stead. 261 However, the nature of the evidence that
will satisfy such burden varies among the different courts in
accordance with the substantive law principles they have developed
for the tracing of misappropriated property. The problem is
heightened in complexity where the property sought to be reached
is not wholly the product of that originally misappropriated, or is
the product of a combination of such property with the wrongdoer's own or with a third person's. The problem most frequently
arises with its greatest complications in banking cases where funds
held subject to a trust have been commingled with the bank's
other funds and thereafter, upon the bank's insolvency, the beneficiary seeks to trace such funds into those passing into the hands
of the bank's receiver.
In the early law there was a good deal of difficulty with respect
to tracing money that had been commingled with other money, for
it was said2 62 that "money has no earmark" and hence cannot be
specifically identified. Although the decision in Knatchbull v.
Hallett26 3 has generally been regarded as having ended the "earmark doctrine" and established in its stead the modern rule whereby it is possible to trace trust moneys into commingled funds, the
Minnesota court as late as 1897 had not definitely committed itself
on the subject. Instead, in Bishop v. Mahoney, 26 4 Canty, J., summarized the four main lines of decisions relating to the problem,
but failed to express a preference for any one for the reason that
the facts of the case did not necessitate it. In later cases, however,
the Minnesota court has recognized both explicitly and implicitly
the principle that the commingling of trust moneys does not of
itself preclude the beneficiary from reclaiming a proportionate
"I-"See Note, (1929) 13 XIINNESOTA LAW RE VIEW 39, 40-41: "The majority view is that the trust fund, to be allowed as a preferred claim
although commingled with other funds of the trustee, must be traced into
a specific fund in the hands of the receiver, to the augmentation of the
trustee's estate." (1932) 30 Mich. L. Rev. 441, 442.
'aSee Blythe v. Kujawa, (1928) 175 Minn. 88, 92, 220 N. W. 168;
Bishop v. Mahoney, (1897) 70 Minn. 238, 242, 73 N. W. 6; Blumenfeld v.
Union Nat'l Bank, (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1930) 38 F. (2d) 455, 457; Rugger v.
Hammond, (1917) 95 Xvash. 85, 96, 163 Pac. 408.
2 62
For discussion, see 3 Scott, Trusts (1939) sec. 515; (1937) 35 Mich.
L. Rev. 1203; Bishop v. Mahoney, (1897) 70 Minn. 238, 240, 73 N. W. 6.
203(1879) 13 Ch. Div. 696.
264(1897)

70 Minn. 238, 73 N. W. 6.
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amount from the commingled fund.26 5 It has also gone a long way

further than the doctrine as stated necessitates, since first recognizing that "some cases go so far as to hold that the trust character
still adheres to money even though it cannot be traced into any
specific property, '266 and then for the time being refusing to accept
or reject the view of such cases.
In In re Seven Corners Bank,2617 the defendant bank, when insolvent and known by its officers to be so, had accepted a check
for collection and sent it to the clearing house where it was used
in balancing the bank's own account. Afterwards, on the same
day, the bank made an assignment for the benefit of creditors, none
of the proceeds of the check coming to the hands of the assignee.
The decision of the court denying a preference to the claimant
because none of the proceeds of the check had come to the hands
of the assignee is entirely sound and in accord with logical concepts underlying the doctrine of tracing funds.2 66 In Bishop v.
Mahoney,2 69 while failing to take a definite position among the
divergent lines of authority summarized in the opinion, the court
did suggest, as the outermost limits of permissible tracing, the
proposition of some cases that "If the trust funds went to augment
the estate of the trustee (and not to pay his other debts) the
cestui que trust has a lien on the general assets of the estate.1 270

A few years later the court concluded that such a proposition
"now has little or no support in any well considered cases, and
would not be followed or adopted by this court."' 271

Subsequent

cases, however, have brought about that very result that "would
26
5See Blythe v. Kujawa, (1928) 175 Minn. 88, 220 N. W. 168; Eastman

v. Farmers' State Bank of Olivia, (1928) 175 Minn. 336, 221 N. W. 236;
Forsythe v. First State Bank of Mentor, (1932) 185 Minn. 255, 241 N. W.
66; Restatement,
Restitution (1937) sec. 215, comment c.
2 6
6 Third Nat'l Bank of St. Paul v. Stillwater Gas Co., (1886) 36 Minn.
75, 78, 30 N. W. 440, 441. See Note, (1929) 13 MiNNEsorA LAW REVIEW 39.
267(1894) 58 Minn. 5, 59 N. W. 633.
2
3SIn accord, see Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 215.
289(1897) 70 Minn. 238, 73 N. W. 6.
27

0Bishop v. Mahoney, (1897) 70 Minn. 238, 241, 73 N. W. 6. The

court distinguished these cases referred to from In re Seven Comers Bank,
(1894) 58 Minn. 5, 59 N. W. 633, on the ground that there "it affirmatively
appeared that the fund sought to be pursued had been paid out by the insolvent on other debts." Thus in 1897 the doctrine of the Seven Comers
Bank Case was still considered to be law in Minnesota. Similarly in City

of St. Paul v. Seymour, (1898) 71 Minn. 303, 74 N. W. 336, the claimant

was denied a preference for the reason that the trust funds never went

directly to augment assets of the insolvent trustee, but instead were used in
payment
of other debts.
2

T'Twohy Mercantile Co. v. Melbye, (1899) 78 Minn. 357, 360, 81 N. W.
20, 21.
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not be followed or adopted by this court." The first departure
was taken in Stein v. Kenip,2 72 where one who had made what the
court termed a special deposit 273 was allowed a preference on the

basis of facts merely showing that his money came into the possession of the bank, without any evidence that it had reached the
hands of the bank's receiver. The court applied a presumption,
recognized in Third National Bank of St. Paid v. Stillwater Gas
Co.,2 7 4 that money traced into the hands of the bank is still there

and the burden of showing otherwise is on the defendant. The
effect of such a presumption is of course in many cases to allow
the claimant to recover money without ever tracing it to the
hands of the receiver or assignee of the insolvent depositary. But
the final evolution of the fundamental aspects of the present Minnesota law occurred in Blvthe v. Kujawa,27 5 where a bank had
accepted a check for $4,500 as a "special deposit." The check was
collected in the form of a credit to its account with a correspondent bank and such credit was subsequently dissipated by
payment of the bank's obligations. The bank had on hand at the
time of its insolvency, and turned over to its receiver, cash in a
sum exceeding the amount of the check, but not including the
proceeds thereof. 276 After holding that the plaintiff's burden of
proof went no further than to require him to show that the proceeds of the check actually came into the hands of the bank, the
court further stated :277
132 Minn. 44, 155 N. W. 1052.
272(1916)
27
3The Minnesota court has been most "liberal" in finding deposits to
have been special. See Blummer v. Scandinavian American State Bank of
Badger, (1926) 169 Minn. 89, 91, 210 N. W. 865, 866: "The money having
been received for the particular purpose the relation of debtor- and creditor
did not exist but rather that of trustee and cestui que trust. The bank had
no title to the money." The juxtaposition of the two sentences quoted
speaks for itself. See, also, City of Canby v. Bank of Canby, (1934) 192
Minn. 571, 257 N. W. 520; Note, Distinction Between Special Deposits and
Deposits for a Specific Purpose, (1922) 6 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 306;
Comment, (1926) 10 MINNESOTA LAW REViW 178.
274(1886) 36 Minn. 75, 30 N. W. 440.
275(1928) 175 Minn. 88, 220 N. W. 168.
27
0The bank had at all times had cash on hand in an amount exceeding
of the check in question.
the amount
277
Blythe v. Kujawa, (1928) 175 Minn. 88, 92, 220 N. W. 168, 169.
The court attempted to distinguish the decision in In re Seven Corners
Bank, (1894) 58 Minn. 5, 59 N. W. 633, on two grounds: first, that
the earlier case had involved a constructive trust rather than an express
trust as in Blythe v. Kujawa; and second, that the opinion therein did
"not show that the bank accepted the check and gave credit therefor, and
the bank received no credit in any other bank therefor." In answer to
the first ground of distinction, the claimant's right to acquire the property
rested in both cases upon equitable owvnership, which exists in the case
of a constructive trust just as much as in the case of an express trust. Such
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"The old rule that one seeking to recover trust funds or property from the receiver of an insolvent bank or person must trace
the identical fund or property into the hands of the receiver has
largely been departed from. ..

. The present rule . . . is that the

identical fund or proceeds need not be traced, it being sufficient
to show that the assets in the hands of the receiver were necessarily increased by the commingling of the proceeds with the
general funds of the bank."
The Minnesota court apparently failed to see a distinction between gross and net assets.. As the supreme court of Rhode
Island has aptly remarked, "How the satisfaction of a debt by
incurring another of equal amount either decreases one's liabilities
or increases his assets can only be comprehended by the philosophic mind of a Micawber." 27s But on the reasoning of Blythe v.
Kujawa the so-called "intermediate balance rule"2 79 would have
no application, and the trust or lien can be impressed as readily
upon any other assets as upon a cash balance. This is exactly the
result of the subsequent case of Eastman v. Farmers State Bank
of Olivia,280 where the augmentation of assets argument was
reaffirmed. The effect of these cases is that really all the claimant
need show is that his funds came into the hands of the bank, and
that there are assets in the hands of the receiver sufficient to pay
a distinction is therefore without merit. With respect to the second ground
of distinction, the opinion in the earlier case did expressly show that the
check was used to balance off the bank's account with the clearing house.
The second ground of distinction is therefore likewise without merit. See
Bauck v. First State Bank of New York Mills, (1929) 178 Minn. 64, 67,
225 N. W. 916, 917, where it is admitted that the rule of the Seven
Corners
Bank case has been modified by these later decisions.
278
Slater v. Oriental Mills, (1893) 18 R. I. 352, 355, 27 Atl. 443, 444.
See also Note, (1928) 13 MINiNESOTA LAw REVIEW 39, 44-45, pointing out,
in reply to the argument that paying a debt or current expenses increases
the assets pro tanto, that "the assets are not increased pro tanto, but are
only increased by the amount which that paid creditor would have received
upon distribution of the bank's assets."
279
Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 212. The Minnesota court on
one occasion has used language recognizing such "lowest intermediate balance" rule. Village of Monticello v. Citizens State Bank of Monticello,
(1930) 180 Minn. 418, 419-422, 230 N. W. 889-890. But the court did not
purport thereby to overrule the decision in Eastman v. Farmers State
Bank of Olivia, (1928) 175 Minn. 336, 221 N. W. 236, which is entirely
inconsistent with the "lowest intermediate balance" rule.
280(1928) 175 Minn. 336, 221 N. W. 236, adversely noted (1929) 27
Mich. L. Rev. 945. See, also, Forsythe v. First State Bank of Mentor,
(1932) 185 Minn. 255, 257, 241 N. W. 66, 67: "The right of the owner to
follow the money into the hands of the bank receiving it formerly depended on his ability to identify it; but the modem rule is that the confusion
does not destroy the equity entirely, but converts it into a charge on the
general mass, giving to the party injured by the unlawful diversion a priority
over the general creditors of the bank;" Henton v. Renville State Bank,
(1935) 194 Minn. 524, 261 N. W. 8.
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his claim or a part thereof. Thereupon the defendant has the burden
of proof, which it is difficult to see how he can carry except by
showing that the claimant's specific moneys have been given away
or otherwise used for a purpose from which no reduction of
28
other liabilities or increase in gross assets has been derived.. '
In other words the Minnesota court has enunciated a doctrine of
tracing that, practically speaking, defies dissipation except by total
annihilation of the constructive trustee's assets or their prior appropriation to the claim of others. Such a concept of tracing does
not in fact require tracing at all, but is a doctrine whereby the
court itself creates a preference at the expense of other creditors
2 82
of the insolvent..
' For the very foundation of the doctrine of
tracing-equitable ownership of specific assets-is today presumed
by the Minnesota court.
In still other cases the Minnesota court has ignored the fact
that there never has been at any time a specific res capable of
being the subject-matter of a trust or lien of any sort. In Winkler
v. Veigel2 s3 it was alleged that the plaintiff, having a checking
account in the defunct bank, had drawn a check upon that account
payable to the bank, requesting that it pay, as his agent, certain
real estate taxes. The bank accepted the check, charged the
drawer's account, agreed to make payment to the tax collector, and
then closed before doing so. In allowing the plaintiff's claim to a
preference the court stated :284
"The initial question presented is whether the giving, of the
check by plaintiffs upon their deposit account in the bank, and the
bank's charging the amount of the check against the account
amounts to the same thing as the payment of that much cash to the
bank.... We think it does. A well reasoned opinion so holding
and affirming the next proposition, that a reduction of the deposit
282
1n Stein v. Kemp, (1916) 132 Minn. 44, 47, 155 N. W. 1052, 1053, the
court stated that "It will not be presumed that the bank or its officers committed a wrong or fraud by converting this fund to their own use or to the
use of any of them," apparently under the impression that for a special
deposit to have been dissipated it must have been used for the personal bene-

fit of28the officers.
2In a number of Minnesota cases a preference has been allowed without discussing or even suggesting a necessity for tracing.

See Eifel v.

Veigel, (1926) 169 Minn. 281, 211 N. W. 332; Adams v. Farmers State
Bank of Olivia, (1928) 176 Minn. 108, 222 N. W. 576; Emerson v. Citizens

State Bank of Mahnomen, (1929) 176 Minn. 584, 224 N. W. 239; County
of Traverse v. Veigel, (1929) 176 Minn. 594, 224 N. W. 159; Hurley v.

Markville State Bank, (1931) 185 Minn. 56, 239 N. W. 769; Benson v.
Albert Lea State Bank, (1932) 185 Minn. 541, 241 N. W. 794, noted (1932)
16 MINNESOTA LAw REVIEW 848.
283(1929) 176 Minn. 384, 223 N. W. 622.
284
Winkler v. Veigel, (1929) 176 Minn. 384, 386, 223 N. W. 622-623.
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account of the maker of the check augments the assets of
8 5the bank
2
is Northwest Lbr. Co. v. ScandinavianAnt. Bank...."
On the assumption that the above transaction was the same
as a cash deposit or a withdrawal and redeposit, the still illogical
conclusion that the bank's assets were thereby augmented followed
from the previously decided Minnesota cases. But to reason from
the fact that, as against a solvent bank, such a transaction merely
omits the useless act of a prior withdrawal followed by a redeposit
for a special purpose, ignores the total absence from the beginning
of a trust res that becomes crucial only in the event of the bank's
insolvency. It ignores also the fact that a mere breach of contract, even of one to create a trust, does not create the trust. In
the above transaction the bank in fact had sent a check to the
county treasurer for the purpose of paying plaintiff's taxes before
its doors were closed, and as a result of the entire transaction the
bank had simply exchanged its creditors, its assets and liabilities
remaining exactly the same as before. There was obviously at no
time any segregation of specific funds capable of becoming a trust
res. The Minnesota decision ignores both banking practice and
the fundamental basis of the trust concept. On the premise that
a res must have existed at some time before there is any occasion
for the application of tracing principles, it must follow that the
plaintiff in the above case was not entitled to a preference over
the general creditors of the bank.
The same problem has arisen under somewhat different circumstances with a like result. In Bauck v. First State Bank of
New York Mills, 2 86 the defendant bank received from the plain-

tiff for collection a check for $1,800 drawn on the X Bank. It
presented that check along with others drawn on the X Bank
which in turn presented all the checks it held that were drawn on
the defendant. By a process of balancing it was found that the
X Bank was indebted to the defendant in the sum of approximately $600, which it promptly paid. Subsequently the defendant
received another check for collection in the amount of $600 drawn
on X Bank and payable to the plaintiff. This time, after a similar
process of balancing, the balance was found to be in favor of the
X Bank in the sum of approximately $700,287 and the defendant
285(1924) 130 Wash. 33, 225 Pac. 825, 39 A. L. R. 922.
286(1929) 178 Minn. 64, 225 N. W. 916.
28This phase of the transaction is essentially the same as that involved

in In re Seven Corners Bank, (1894) 58 Minn. 5, 59 N. W. 633, where
the court had denied the claim of a preference on the ground that "it stands
on the same footing as any other claim."
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paid that amount to the X Bank.

But before the plaintiff re-

The court
ceived payment, the defendant bank was closed.
allowed the plaintiff a preference to the full amount of both
checks on the same reasoning previously developed in Winkler v.
Veigel. Again the same criticism suggests itself. To the extent
that the defendant bank had received payment of its first credit
balance with the X Bank, the plaintiff was properly entitled to
such amount as the proceeds of a check presented for collection.2 88
But as to the remainder, there was nothing more than a process
of debiting and crediting, and in such a process the necessary initial
res cannot be found. Except for the payment of the credit balance
actually received, there was not even an augmentation of the defendant bank's assets.
On the basis of these and other cases 2 9 it must be recognized
that the logical structure underlying the common law doctrines of
tracing trust assets has been substantially ignored by the Minnesota court in the cases involving claims of preferences against
insolvent banks, and the judicial creation of arbitrary preferences
substituted. Mr. Justice Stone has seen that it is time to call a

halt, dissenting in City of Canby v. Bank of Canby,290
"I have been forced to the opinion that we have gone altogether
too far in ignoring the fundamental fact that a 'debt is not a
trust,' "
and again in Schendel v. Peyton,2 91
28
sThe Bank Collection Code provides in effect that "where an agent
collecting bank other than the drawee or payor fails after it has received the
proceeds of collection and before it has remitted them or so credited them
that it has become a debtor, its assets shall be impressed with a trust in
favor of the owvner of the items sent to it for collection, and that the owner
shall be entitled to a preferred claim upon such assets, irrespective of
whether the fund representing such items can be traced and identified as part
of such assets." See Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 215, comment j.
While Minnesota has not adopted the Bank Collection Code, it apparently
is in judicial accord therewith. Eifel v. Veigel, (1926) 169 Minn. 281, 211
N. W. 332; and see Comment, (1930) 14 MINNESOTA LAw REVIEW 407.
2tDSee, also, for example, First Nat'l Bank of Milaca v. Benson, (1934)
192 Minn. 90, 255 N. W. 482 (contra to Restatement, Restitution (1937)
sec. 215, comment h) ; Schendel v. Peyton, (1935) 194 Minn. 162, 259 N. W.
692 (apparently contra to Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec 215, comment f); Comment, (1939) 23 MINNESOTA LAw REVIEW 217. Curiously
the court held correctly, in County of Lincoln v. Farmers State Bank of
Arco, (1931) 182 Minn. 291, 234 N. W. 449, that a trust is not created by a
bank's acceptance of its customer's check and issuance of its own cashier's
check for the specific purpose of transferring the customer's deposit to
another bank, although admitting that, just as much as in Winkler v.
Veigel, (1929) 176 Minn. 384, 223 N. W. 622, the bank's assets "were
augmented because the check did not complete its clearance journey" prior
to the bank's failure.

290(1934) 192 Minn. 571, 581, 257 N. W. 520, 525.
29(1935) 194 Minn. 162, 166, 259 N. W. 692, 694.
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"I protest against what seems to me to be an artificial preference. We have too many already. The loss to depositors is large
enough now without this new category of preferences."
In line with the last preceding sentence of Mr. justice Stone's,
the following pertinent comments by Professor Scott cannot be
recommended too highly to the Minnesota court :29?
"Most of the writers of monographs on the subject of priorities and many of the judges appear to think that there is something essentially commendable in giving one claimant priority over
others. This is a peculiar psychological phenomenon. It is doubtless due to a comfortable feeling of generosity to the victim, and
it has the peculiar advantage that the generosity is wholly vicarious. It is not the writer of the monograph or the judge who pays
the bill, but the general creditors of the wrongdoer. The writer
or judge constantly refers to his view as 'liberal.' It is liberal in
that it is a wider rule than the rule which requires some form of
tracing. It is liberal in that the money to which the general creditors would otherwise be entitled is given to the claimant. It is
liberal in the same sense in which the broader a rule is as to imposing a liability upon defendants, the more liberal the rule. A
rule which imposes liability without fault is more liberal than one
which imposes liability only if there is fault; but it may or may
not be a more just rule. Juries often have the same feeling, when
they hold a defendant liable regardless of the evidence and fix the
damages at a large figure. The point which I am making is that to
be liberal is not always to be just, particularly where someone
other than the liberal-minded person foots the bill. .

.

. I believe

that the general principle that equality is equity is a sound one.
If one claimant in the distribution of an estate of an insolvent
seeks to be paid ahead of the other claimants, it is for him to show
a good reason. When a rascal is insolvent all his victims including
his general creditors should share their losses ratably unless there
is a pretty strong reason why one should come ahead of the others.
Justice between the insolvent and his creditors would require that
all the creditors should be paid in full. This, however, is impossible as long as blood cannot be obtained from a turnip. It is
impossible to give every claimant priority over every other claimant. Unless a particular claimant can show that the wrongdoer
still has his property, in one form or another, he should share
ratably with the other creditors."
It has been pointed out that where "there is more than one
valid claim to a preference and the total of these claims results in
there being a lien on the property subject to these claims for a
sum greater than its value, the general rule is to prorate these
claims; but there is at least one case holding that if any of the preferred depositors can show that his identical coins are there, he
2923 Scott, Trusts (1939) 2499-2500.
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should be paid in full and the rest paid pro rata from the
residue. 2 - 3 This is the rule of the Restatement, 294 and the one
supported by Professor Scott. 95
Some cases have applied the

rule in Clayton's Case that the first money in is the first out and
thus have paid the claimants in the inverse order of their deposits.2 °0 But such a rule is founded on a purely fictional intent
297
Althat has no proper application to the present situation.
though there are no Minnesota cases directly in point, it is deemed
likely from past utterances of the Minnesota court that it will
follow the Restatement and majority rule in this respect when the
occasion arises. It should be noted, however, that the court has
awarded preferences to the particular claimants before the court
without inquiry into whether there may be other claimants similarly situated. Where the insolvent's assets do not even equal the
total amount of the preferred claims, such a procedure results in
a race in diligence among the claimants. Here again the Minnesota court would do well to heed the words of caution of Professor
Scott that
"Where a claimant seeks a preference and it is not certain
whether there are other claimants in the same situation, the court
should withhold payment by the receiver until it can be ascertained
whether the total amount of such claims exceeds the amount of
such assets with respect to which the preferences are awarded."' 8
2
-',Note, (1929) 13 MINNEsOTA LAW REvEW 39, 45. The case referred
to is Boyle v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank of Superior, (1905) 125 Wis. 498,
103 N. W. 1123, 104 N. W. 917, 1 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1110, 110 Am. St. Rep.
844. See,
also, Comment (1937) 35 Mich. L. Rev. 1203.
-' 4 Restatement, Restitution (1937) secs. 213, 215, comment d.
2 -53 Scott, Trusts (1939) sec. 519.
2

-°GSee Boyle v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank of Superior, (1905) 125 Wis.

498, 103 N. W. 1123, 104 N. W. 917, 1 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1110, 110 Am. St.
Rep. 844; Hewitt v. Hayes, (1910) 205 Mass. 356, 91 N. E. 332, 137 Am.

St. Rep. 448; cf. In re Walter J.Schmidt Co., (D. N.Y. 1923) 298 Fed.

314, 207
316.
Restatement, Restitution (1937) sec. 213, comment c; 3 Scott, Trusts
(1939) sec. 519; Note, (1929) 13 MINNESOTA LAw REVIEW 39, 45.
2'"13 Scott, Trusts (1939) 2583.

